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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE-A TOOL TO MAKE 
FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES INCREASE 
PROTECTION OF PUBLIC LAND AND ITS 
RESOURCES 
Susan D. Baer* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately 727,000,000 acres of federal public land 
in the United States.! Upon this land there are almost 86,000 miles 
of streams containing trout, salmon and other fish, thousands of 
recreational areas, wild animals including burros, horses, caribou, 
bear, deer, antelope, and an immense variety of other natural re-
sources. 2 
Several federal agencies are responsible for administrating public 
land and its diverse resources. Within the Department of the Interior 
these include, among others, the Bureau of Land Management 
(BLM), the National Park Service, and the Fish and Wildlife Ser-
vice. 3 Additionally, the Forest Service is within the Department of 
Agriculture. 4 Concerned citizen and environmental groups have at-
tacked decisions by each of these agencies regarding use of natural 
resources. 5 One area of continuing controversy stems from the agen-
* Topics Editor, 1987-1988, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1987 
183 (1986). About one half of the federal public land is located in Alaska. The federal govern-
ment owns approximately 95% of Alaska because, due to its remoteness, it has been subject 
to very little development. More than 90% of federally-owned land outside of Alaska is located 
in eleven western states. A. REITZE, ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND AND 
RESOURCES, ch. 5 at 8 (1974). 
2 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, MANAGING THE NATION'S PUBLIC LANDS, FISCAL 
YEAR 1985 6 (1986). 
3 A. REITZE, supra note 1, ch. 5 at 11-12. 
4 [d. at 5-12. 
5 See generally Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS 
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cies' classification decisions regarding the federal public lands that 
they administer.6 For example, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield 
AcF directs the Forest Service to administer national forests for as 
many uses as will achieve maximum public benefit. 8 Although the 
Act specifically states that the greatest revenue producing use is not 
necessarily the most beneficial use,9 the Forest Service frequently 
favors high revenue use over other uses due to political pressures. 10 
In spite of the many federal statutes governing public land re-
sources that the public may seek to enforce, courts generally defer 
to administrative agency expertise in deciding public land contro-
versies. 11 Most courts intervene only in the most egregious cases. 
Therefore, the public's interest in public lands is subsumed into 
federal agency action. 
Given the Reagan Administration's environmental policies12 and 
the uncertainty of its successor's policies, it appears that now, more 
than ever, new legal tools are necessary to protect public land against 
politically motivated federal agencies. The public trust doctrine, if 
clarified and strengthened, may be of future use against federal 
agency actions. 
The public trust doctrine governs the use and disposition of lands 
by both private parties and the government. Its basic premise is 
L. REV. 269 (1980). The concerned citizen and environmental groups include, among others, 
the Sierra Club, the Friends of Yosemite, and the Audubon Society. 
6Id. at 272. 
716 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982). 
8Id. at §§ 529, 531. See generally Montgomery, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land 
Law: Its Application in the Judicial Review of Land Classification Decisions, 8 WILLAME'ITE 
L.J. 135, 137 (1972). 
9 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1982). 
10 Montgomery, supra note 8, at 138-39. 
11 See infra notes 222-39 and accompanying text. 
12 The Reagan Administration has not been inclined toward environmental protection. See, 
e.g., Strock, The Congress and the President: From Confrontation to Creative Tension, 17 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,006, 10,008 (Jan. 1987) ("The [Reagan] Administration 
has too often appeared to view environmental issues under economists' eyeshades, and more 
from the vantage point of regulation affecting commerce than health and safety."); Oakes, 
Reagan's Record on the Environment Fails to Match His Claims, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 29, 
1984, at 4, col. 3 ("[Ronald Reagan] is in fact the only openly anti-environmental president in 
our history.") (In support of this statement, Oakes cites President Reagan's efforts to stop 
acquisition of much-needed parkland, to destroy wilderness areas through mineral develop-
ment and reckless road-building, to sell the nation's timber at below-market rates, and his 
support offormer Secretary of the Interior Watt and former Environmental Protection Agency 
Administrator Burford in their efforts to undermine the protection of the nation's environ-
ment.); Udall, Introduction to Volume 10 (Critique of President Reagan's Environmental 
Policies), 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1982)(Congressman Udall discusses the Reagan Administra-
tion's assault on environmental protection and cites, for example, the Administration's de-
priving programs of much-needed funds and interpreting a 20-year period of discretionary 
mineral leasing as being mandatory.). 
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that certain natural resources are impressed with a trust for the 
public's benefit.13 Furthermore, the government has an affirmative 
duty to act as trustee in regard to these resources, and courts have 
an obligation to ensure that the government and its agencies fulfill 
this duty.14 Under the classic public trust doctrine, the sovereign 
holds the lands under navigable waters and tidelands in trust for the 
benefit of its citizens. As trustee, the sovereign has an affirmative 
duty to protect the trust property and the beneficiaries of the trust, 
the citizens, have the power to compel the trustee to honor its trust 
obligations. 
This Comment focuses on the public trust doctrine's potential as 
a tool to force federal administrative agencies to protect natural 
resources. Section II overviews the public trust doctrine's origins 
and its development as part of American common law. Section III 
examines numerous federal statutes through which Congress has 
implicitly delegated its public trust responsibilities to federal admin-
istrative agencies. Section IV explores public trust beneficiaries' 
rights against these federal administrative agencies to enforce the 
public trust. Section V posits reasons why these rights, and there-
fore natural resources themselves, are protected inadequately. Fi-
nally, Section VI suggests means to strengthen the public trust 
doctrine and ways to implement a newly-strengthened doctrine. This 
Comment concludes that, although the public trust doctrine is not 
currently an effective tool in forcing federal agency protection of 
natural resources, it has the potential to be one upon some initiative 
by the judiciary and future plaintiffs. 15 
II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE 
An examination of the public trust doctrine's historical develop-
ment is useful as a foundation for understanding the doctrine's pres-
ent and future role in protecting public resources. On the state level, 
13 Although traditionally invoked to protect the public's rights to conduct commerce, navi-
gate and fish in navigable waters, the doctrine has been used to include protection of, among 
others, migratory waterfowl (In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 
1980», parkland (Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 
(1966», and sport-caught fish (People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1151, 196 
Cal. Rptr. 7 (1983». 
14 See generally Stevens, The Public Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes 
The People's Environmental Right, 14 D.C. DAVIS L. REV. 195 (1980); Wilkinson, supra note 
5. 
15 For a contrary view of the public trust doctrine's application to public land law, see 
Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective-and Undesirable-Judicial 
Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455 (1982). 
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the public trust doctrine developed as a source of state power and 
as a set of affirmative duties owed to, and enforced by, the citizens 
of each state. On the federal level, the public trust doctrine devel-
oped primarily as a source of federal power. Through a series of 
statutes,16 Congress has delegated this power, along with its recip-
rocal obligations, to certain federal agencies. These agencies have 
then used the statutory delegations to exercise control over public 
land and resources. 
A. Roman and English Law Roots 
The roots of the public trust doctrine begin in Roman law. As 
noted in the work of the Roman jurist, Justinian: 
Things common to mankind by the law of nature, are the air, 
running water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea 
The use of the sea-shore . . . is also [governed] by the law of 
nations . . . and all persons are at equal liberty to land their 
vessels, unload them, and to fasten ropes to the trees upon the 
banks as to navigate upon the river itself ... for the shores are 
not understood to be property in any man, but are compared to 
the sea itself, and to the sand or ground which is under the sea. 17 
Several commentators argue that Justinian's book was an idealiza-
tion of Roman public rights. 18 They state that, in practice, the Roman 
government frequently conveyed private rights in coastal resources 
for commercial purposes. Therefore, Roman law may be more useful 
as a source of theory than as an example of the public trust doctrine 
in actual use. 
Centuries later the public trust doctrine spread to England 
through the work of Bracton, who incorporated whole passages of 
the Institutes into his writings in the mid-thirteenth century.19 In 
England, the doctrine developed into the concepts of jus privatum, 
the right to private ownership, and jus publicum, the right vested 
in the King to hold such property as the sea, rivers, and land below 
16 See infra notes 53-104 and accompanying text. 
17 J. INST. bk.2, tit. 1, pts.I-5, at 67-68. (T. Cooper trans. 1852). For a detailed discussion 
of the Roman origins of the public trust doctrine, see Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: 
A Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762, 763-68 (1970). 
18 Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA 
GRANT L.J. 13, 23-26 (1976); Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty 
in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-34 
(1986). 
19 2 H. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 39-40 (S. Thorne trans. 1977). 
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the high water mark for the benefit of the public. 20 Again, commen-
tators have criticized the public trust doctrine as being more of an 
idealization than a reflection of English law then in force. 21 One 
commentator asserts that the government formally recognized public 
rights in coastal resources only as a means to establish the Crown's 
ownership of these resources to increase the Crown's wealth. 22 
B. American Common Law Development 
Jurists incorporated the public trust doctrine into American com-
mon law through a series of nineteenth century cases. 23 These cases 
adopted the division of possible interests in navigable waters found 
in Lord Chief Justice Hale's 1667 treatise, De Jure Maris et Bra-
chiorum ejusdem (Concerning the Law of the Sea and its Arms).24 
These interests were: 1) jus publicum: the right of the general 
public; 2) jus regium: the royal right to manage the kingdom's re-
sources for public safety and welfare, that is, essentially police 
power; and 3) jus privatum: the private right of title. 25 Jus publicum 
was divided among the federal and states' sovereign interests. 26 
1. Development at the State Level 
Title to American tidewaters and tidelands passed from the En-
glish Crown to the Colonies after the American Revolution and then 
vested in the States in trust for public use. 27 Although the commerce 
20 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 11 (1894). 
21 See Deveney, supra note 18, at 36 and Lazarus, supra note 18, at 635. 
22 Lazarus, supra note 18 at 635. But see Lord Mansfield, Rex. v. Eyres, 4 Burr. Part IV 
21,190 (1766) ("[TJhe King has no interest in this money, he is only Royal trustee for the 
party."). The Magna Carta is often cited as a pre-Bracton source of public trust rights in 
coastal areas. This is because it contains the principle that, in some ways, the King was 
subject to the people and that there were specific limitations imposed on the king's powers. 
See Note, supra note 17, at 765. See also Deveney, supra note 18, at 39. 
23 See, e.g., Shively, 152 U.S. at 11-14; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876); Pollard's 
Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 220-24 (1845); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 
(16 Pet.) 367,411 (1842); Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 317 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). For an 
in-depth study of the public trust doctrine's incorporation into American jurisprudence, see 
M. SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS: THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN 
AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY (1987). 
24 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 636; Deveney, supra note 18, at 53. 
25 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 636; Deveney, supra note 18, at 45. 
26 There is some question as to whether jus publicum vested in the sovereign or whether 
it vested in the public and was held in trust by the sovereign for the public's benefit. Deveney, 
supra note 18, at 58. 
27 Shively, 152 U.S. at 48-49 (citing Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 
409-411 (1842)). 
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clause of the Constitution28 gave the federal government the right 
to regulate interstate commerce, the states continued to reserve 
title to lands under navigable waters. 29 
Nineteenth century case-law established that each state has spe-
cial powers over water resources that it holds in trust. Additionally, 
these cases established that each state also owes the public certain 
enforceable duties. 30 In one of the earliest cases to refer to the public 
trust concept, Arnold v. Mundy,3! the New Jersey Supreme Court 
held that the state legislature could not alienate public access and 
use rights in water resources. 32 Toward the end of the nineteenth 
century, in the landmark case of Illinois Central Railroad v. Illi-
nois,33 the United States Supreme Court held that the Illinois leg-
islature's grant of submerged lands along the Chicago waterfront 
impaired the state's jus regium and was therefore void.34 In making 
this decision, the Illinois Central Court stated: 
[The title of Illinois to the lands below the navigable waters of 
Lake Michigan] is a title held in trust for the people of the State 
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carryon 
commerce over them, and have liberty of fishing therein freed 
from the obstruction or interference of private parties . . . . The 
trust devolving upon the State for the public, and which can only 
be discharged by the management and control of property in 
which the public has an interest, cannot be relinquished by a 
transfer of the property. The control of the State for the purposes 
of the trust can never be lost, except as to such parcels as are 
used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be 
disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public 
interest in the lands and water remaining. 35 
The Supreme Court therefore explicitly recognized the public's 
rights and interests in the free use of navigable waters.36 Courts 
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
29 Pollard's Lessee, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 229. 
30 Lazarus, supra note 18, at 637. 
31 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821). 
32 [d. at 78. "The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with the principles 
of the law of nature and the constitution of a well ordered society, make a direct and absolute 
grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It would be 
a grievance which could never be long borne by a free people." [d. The Supreme Court cited 
Arnold in Martin v. Lessee of Waddell. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 417. The case was also relied 
upon in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 456 (1892). However, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court later overruled Arnold. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 458-61 
(1850), afi'd, Bell v. Gough, 23 N.J.L. 624 (1852). 
33 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
84 [d. at 452-54. 
35 [d. at 452-53. 
36 [d. 
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referred to the Illinois Central decision throughout the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries to support judicial control of state legisla-
tures' excessive grants of public lands to private parties. 37 
2. Development at the Federal Level 
Although the public trust doctrine developed primarily as a matter 
of state law, there is also judicial precedent for its application to the 
federal government. For example, in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,38 
the Supreme Court ruled that the United States held territorial lands 
under navigable waters as temporary trustee until it transferred the 
lands to newly-formed states. 39 The Court further stated that the 
federal government held public lands in trust in order to be able to 
sell off the lands for "the payment of debt, and to erect new states 
over the territory thus ceded."40 Until the mid-nineteenth century, 
courts considered the federal government to be only a temporary 
trustee. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, how-
ever, the federal government formally asserted its permanent public 
trust powers as justification for its protection of federal public 
lands. 41 
This change in the federal government's role was due, in part, to 
a developing consensus that public lands should be protected for 
future generations. 42 For example, in the 1891 case Knight v. United 
States Land Ass'n,43 the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of 
the Interior is "the guardian of the people of the United States over 
the public lands. The obligations of his oath of office oblige him to 
see that the law is carried out, and that none of the public domain 
is wasted or is disposed of to a party not entitled to it. "44 Moreover, 
37 See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 26 Cal. 3d 515,521-22, 
162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 330, 606 P.2d 362, 365 (1980), cert. denied sub. nom., Santa Fe Land 
Improvement Co. v. Berkeley, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); State v. Longyear Holding Co., 224 Minn. 
451,471,29 N.W.2d 657,669 (1947); Bunch v. Hodel, 793 F.2d 129, 133 (6th Cir. 1986). 
38 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). 
39 I d. at 220-21. 
4°Id. at 224. See also Hart v. Delphey, 157 Iowa 316, 136 N.W. 702 (1912)(lands which had 
been granted, but not patented, were held by the federal government in trust for the state 
or for its grantee). 
41 See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 279-81. 
42 Id. at 280. 
43 142 U.S. 161 (1891). 
44 I d. at 181. Knight involved an action of ejectment regarding a block of land that bordered 
San Francisco bay. Plaintiff, the United States Land Association, sought to recover the land 
from defendant, an individual, and asserted that, because the land was below the high water 
mark when Mexico conveyed California to the United States, upon California's admission to 
the Union the land enured to California by virtue of its sovereignty over tidelands. Id. at 162. 
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in the 1911 case Light v. United States,45 the Supreme Court upheld 
Forest Service regulations regarding grazing in national forests, on 
the grounds that "the public lands . . . are held in trust for the 
people of the whole countrY,"46 and "the [g]overnment is charged 
with the duty and clothed with the power to protect the public 
domain from trespass and unlawful appropriation. "47 Thus the Su-
preme Court explicitly recognized the federal public trusteeship. 48 
Federal cases in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
and their progeny49 uniformly upheld the federal government's 
power to take control of public lands. 50 Because federal agencies 
have become today's federal trustees, it is significant that Congress, 
even at this early stage in the doctrine's development, considered 
federal administrative agencies, such as the Forest Service and the 
Department of the Interior, as the proper implementing agents for 
federal public trust duties. 
III. STATUTORY DELEGATION OF PUBLIC TRUST POWERS AND 
DUTIES TO FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
The public trust doctrine languished somewhat in the early twen-
tieth century. It was not until Professor Joseph Sax's seminal and 
oft-quoted 1970 article that the doctrine was actively incorporated 
into modern jurisprudence. 51 As a result of Sax's article, a number 
of scholars have written articles about the public trust doctrine and 
arguments based upon trust imposed duties have appeared in both 
state and federal courts. 52 
One issue involved the Secretary of the Interior's power to order a new survey of the land. 
The Court concluded that the Secretary of the Interior, by virtue of his power over lands in 
the public domain, had ample power to order a new survey of the land at issue. Id. at 176-
82. 
45 220 U.S. 523 (1911). 
46Id. at 537 (quoting, United States v. Trinidad Coal & Coking Co., 137 U.S. 160 (1890)). 
47Id. at 536 (quoting, United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1887)). For further examples 
of judicial recognition of the federal government's trust duties and powers, see also Utah 
Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917)(injunction proper when issued to 
prevent unauthorized use of public lands); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 
(1897)(Congress has authority to prohibit the erection of fences on private land which effec-
tively enclosed public land). 
46 Light, 220 U.S. at 536-37. 
49 As of 1980 there had been eighteen public land cases using trust language to support the 
federal government's power to protect public lands. See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 281. 
5{J Id. 
51 Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Interven-
tion, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
52 See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 18; Deveney, supra note 18; Wilkinson, supra note 5; 
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In addition to Professor Sax's resurrection of the public trust 
doctrine, beginning in the 1970s53 Congress enacted a series of stat-
utes that implicitly delegated to various federal administrative agen-
cies the power to protect public trust property. These include, among 
others, the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act,54 the Fed-
eral Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA),55 the National 
Park Service Act,56 and the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).57 
Congress enacted the Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act 
in 1971 to protect "all unbranded and unclaimed horses and burros 
on public lands of the United States."58 Under the Act, the Secretary 
of the Interior is "authorized and directed to protect and manage 
wild free-roaming horses and burros as components of the public 
lands."59 In Kleppe v. New Mexico,60 the Supreme Court upheld the 
Act's constitutionality as a valid exercise of congressional power 
Montgomery, supra note 8; Stevens, supra note 14; Jaffe, The Public Trust Doctrine is Alive 
and Kicking in New Jersey Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea - A Case of 
Happy Atavism, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 309 (1974); Note, supra note 17; and, Note, Propri-
etary Duties of the Federal Goverument Under the Public Land Trust, 75 MICH. L. REV. 586 
(1977) [hereinafter Proprietary Duties]. 
53 For a brief study of the evolution of federal public land policy up until this period, see 
Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 294-98. 
54 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982). 
5543 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
56 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). These three statutes are particularly useful 
to the premise of this Comment because they, or cases involving them, contain explicit trust 
language. For examples of other post-1970 statutory public trust delegations to federal 
agencies, see, e.g., The Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1982 
& Supp. IV 1986), enacted to "preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or 
enhance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and succeeding generations." 16 
U.S.C. § 1452(1) (1982). See also The National Wildlife System Administration Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 668dd-668ee (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); and The Migratory Bird Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 715-715s (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
57 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); Superfund Amendments and Reauthor-
ization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 
1613 (SARA). 
58 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1982). 
59 I d. § 1333. 
60 426 U.S. 529, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). New Mexico, its Livestock Board and 
the purchaser of three unbranded burros sought a declaratory judgment that the Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act was unconstitutional and also sought an injunction against 
enforcement of the Act. The Board rounded up nineteen unbranded burros pursuant to New 
Mexico's Estray Law and sold them at public auction. Pursuant to the Wild Free-Roaming 
Horses and Burros Act, the Secretary of the Interior demanded that the Board recover the 
animals and return them to public lands. The Supreme Court held that Congress' power over 
pulilic lands under the Property Clause included the power to protect the wildlife living upon 
such lands. 426 U.S. at 533-35. 
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under the Property Clause.61 The Court also discussed the "broad 
trustee and police powers over wild animals" which states possess 
but which are subordinate to the paramount power of the federal 
government.62 Although originally invoked to protect the public's 
rights to conduct commerce, navigate and fish in navigable waters, 
the public trust rationale has been used, at the federal level, to 
include protection of public lands63 and wildlife.64 The Wild Free-
Roaming Horses and Burros Act merely codifies the public trust 
doctrine with regard to wild horses and burros by statutorily em-
powering and requiring the Secretary of the Interior to protect these 
animals for the benefit of present and future generations of Ameri-
cans, the trust beneficiaries. 
Congress again delegated power over public trust property to a 
federal agency in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 
1976 (FLPMA).65 This Act directs that: 
the public lands be managed [by the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment] in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, 
scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air and atmospheric, 
water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropri-
ate, will preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural 
condition; that will provide food and habitat for fish and wildlife 
and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor recrea-
tion and human occupancy and use. 66 
FLPMA, therefore, codifies the public trust doctrine's basic tenets 
of protection and preservation of natural resources for present and 
61 426 U.S. at 536-41. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. "The Congress shall have Power 
to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory as other 
Property belonging to the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Property 
Clause has been cited both in case-law and in law review articles as a possible source of the 
federal government's power to enforce its public trust duties. See infra notes 292--306 and 
accompanying text. 
62 426 U.S. at 545. 
63 Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). For a discussion of the case, see 
supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
64 In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980)(migratory fowl). For 
a discussion of this case, see infra notes 179-84 and accompanying text. 
65 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
66 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (1982). Per Title III of the Act, the Secretary of the Interior must 
maintain an inventory of public lands and manage them according to FLPMA regulations. [d. 
§§ 1733, 1740. Per Title IV, the Secretary may issue permits and leases regarding grazing on 
public lands. [d. §§ 1751-1753. Per Titles V and VI, the Secretary may grant rights-of-way 
over public lands and designate certain land as wilderness. [d. §§ 1761-1771, 1782. For 
discussion of problems of FLPMA implementation, see Gregg, Federal Land Transfers in the 
West Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 499. 
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future generations. The Act further requires the Department of the 
Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to manage the public 
lands on the basis of mUltiple-use and sustained-yield. 67 This means 
that the public lands are to be administered for as many uses as will 
achieve maximum public benefit. 68 Due to political pressures, how-
ever, the BLM consistently favors economic uses over non-economic 
uses. 69 As a result, the Act has lost some of its original force. 
The theory and values espoused in the public trust doctrine also 
appear in other congressional delegations of power to federal agen-
cies. For example, the National Park Service Organic Act7° estab-
lished the national park system and authorized the Secretary of the 
Interior to administer that system. 71 The purpose of the Act is to 
"conserve the scenery and the national and historic objects and the 
wild life [in national parks, monuments, and reservations] ... and 
to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by 
such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of 
future generations."72 A 1978 amendment to the Act, intended to 
clarify regulatory authority, further mandates that "the protection, 
management, and administration of these areas ... be conducted in 
light of the high public value and integrity of the National Park 
System and shall not be exercised in derogation of the values and 
purposes for which these various areas have been established 
•••• "73 Therefore, the National Park Service Organic Act imposes 
67 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1982). See generally Coggins, Of Succotash Syndromes and Vacuous 
Platitudes: The Meaning of "Multiple Use Sustained Yield" for Public Lands Management, 
53 U. COLO. L. REV. 229 (1982); Gregg, Symposium on The Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act: Introduction, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 271 (1979); Comment, FLPMA's Legislative 
Veto Provisions and INS v. Chadha: Who Controls the Federal Lands?, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 791 (1985). 
68 Montgomery, supra note 8, at 137. For a more in-depth discussion of the multiple-use 
sustained-yield policy, see infra notes 244-59 and accompanying text. 
69 Montgomery, supra note 8, at 139. Examples of economic and non-economic uses are: oil 
development versus preservation as a wildlife refuge; lumber operations versus preservation 
as a national forest; and dam construction versus protection of endangered species. 
70 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Although this Act was originally promulgated 
in 1916, it is included with the analysis of post-1970 statutes because of its substantive 1978 
amendment. 
71 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-3 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
72 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)(emphasis added). 
73 Pub. L. No. 95-250, 92 Stat. 166 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1982». Unlike 
previously discussed acts, the, National Park Service Act specifically delineates "future gen-
erations." 16 U.S.C. § la-l (1982). For a discussion of the Act and its implementation, see 
generally Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks From the External Threats Dilemma, 20 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1985). 
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a duty on the Secretary of the Interior to act as trustee of national 
parks and to protect them for enjoyment by present and future 
beneficiaries of the trust. 
The most recent delegation of Congress' public trusteeship powers 
is through the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA).74 In enacting CERCLA in 1980, 
Congress authorized federal and state governments, as trustees, to 
recover from responsible parties for damages to natural resources 
caused by releases of hazardous substances. 75 Section 101(16) defines 
natural resources as: "land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground 
water, drinking water supplies, and other such resources belonging 
to, managed by, held in trust by, appertaining to, or otherwise 
controlled by the United States . . ., and State or local government 
.. "76 Section 107(f) provides: 
The President, or the authorized representative of any State, 
shall act on behalf of the public as trustee of such natural re-
sources to recover for . . . damages. Sums recovered by the 
United States government as trustee under this subsection shall 
be retained by the trustee, without further appropriation, for 
use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of such 
natural resources. 77 
Section 107(f) further requires the President to designate those 
federal officials who will act as natural resources trustees. 78 
7442 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
75 42 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (1982). See also Kenison, Buchholz & Mulligan, State Actions for 
Natural Resource Damages: Enforcement of the Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. 
Instit.) 10,434 (Nov. 1987). For a concise review of the 1986 natural resource provisions, see 
Atcheson, Goldberg, Ellrod & Connors, An Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund 
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Instit.) 
10,360,10,395-96 (Dec. 1986). For analysis of the pre-SARA natural resource provisions, see: 
Breen, CERCLA's Natural Resource Damages Provisions: What Do We Know So Far?, 14 
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Instit.) 10304 (Aug. 1984); Breen, Natural Resource Recovery by 
Federal Agencies-A Roadmap to Avoid Losing Causes of Action, 13 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. 
L. Instit.) 10324 (Oct. 1983); Note, Defining the Appropriate Scope of Superfund Natural 
Resource Damage Claims: How Great an Expansion of Liability?, 5 VA. J. OF NAT. RE-
SOURCES L. 197 (1985). 
76 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1982), amended by, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1615 (emphasis added). 
7742 U.S.C. § 9607(0 (1982), amended by, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1630-1631. 
78 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1629. The 
National Contingency Plan, as codified at 40 C.F.R. § 300.72, designates four classes of federal 
trustees: (1) "the head of ... [aJ Federal land managing agency" is trustee for "damage to 
resources of any kind located on, over, or under land subject to the management or protection 
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Unlike the federal statutes discussed previously,79 CERCLA does 
not require the executive branch to affirmatively protect natural 
resources. It does, however, empower the executive branch to seek 
retribution for damages to natural resources once such damages have 
already occurred. Arguably, the deterrent effect of CERCLA will 
result in indirect protection of natural resources by discouraging 
responsible parties from permitting injurious releases of hazardous 
substances. To date, however, the federal government has been slow 
to exercise its powers under CERCLA's natural resource provi-
sions.80 Also, few citizen groups have attempted to use CERCLA's 
citizen suits provision81 to force any federal agency to honor its 
trusteeship duties. 82 Because the delegation of public trust powers 
encompassed in CERCLA is relatively undiscovered both by agen-
cies and by citizen groups, its effectiveness in providing even after-
the-fact protection of natural resources remains to be seen. 
Although pre-1970s acts are not to be attributed to Professor Sax's 
reintroduction of the public trust doctrine into American jurispru-
dence, some of these acts contain delegations of congressional au-
thority regarding public trust property and have been invoked to 
impose trust duties. These delegating acts include, among others: 
of ... [that agency];" (2) "the head of ... [a] Federal [resource] agency" is trustee for 
"damage to fixed or non-fixed resources subject to the management or protection of ... [that] 
agency;" (3) the Secretary of Commerce; and (4) the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior. 40 C.F.R. §§ 300. 72(a)(1)-300. 72(d)(2) (1987). 
79 See supra notes 54-73 and accompanying text. 
80 The federal government has yet to recover money for damages to natural resources under 
CERCLA. For an example of pending litigation, see United States v. AVX Corp., No. 83-
3882-Y (D. Mass. plaintiffs' reply brief filed July 17, 1987), Envtl. L. Rep. Pend. Lit. (Envtl. 
L. Instit.) 65,809, 65,827, 65,951, 65,957, 65,973 (The Department of Commerce and Massa-
chusetts both brought actions under § 107 of CERCLA for polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) 
contamination of New Bedford harbor.). 
81 Pub. L. No. 99-499, 1986 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (100 Stat.) 1704. 
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf--(l) against any person 
(including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency 
... ) who is alleged to be in violation of any standard, regulation, condition, require-
ment or order which has become effective pursuant to this Act ... ; or (2) against 
the President or any officer of the United States (including the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency ... ) where there is alleged a failure of the Pres-
ident or of such other officer to perform any act or duty under this Act which is not 
discretionary . . . . 
[d. 
82 See, e.g., Goldberg V. Clark, No. 84-1802 (D.D.C. complaint filed June 13, 1984), Envtl. 
L. Rep. Pend. Lit. (Envtl. L. Instit.) 65,828 (New Mexico and three environmental groups 
sued to compel the Secretary of the Interior and the Administrator of the EPA to promulgate 
natural resource regulations as mandated by §§ 112 and 303 of CERCLA.). 
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the Wilderness Act;83 the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act;84 
and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).85 
The Wilderness Act86 established the National Wilderness Preser-
vation System, which is comprised of federal lands that are desig-
nated as wilderness areas. 87 The Act's policy is to "secure for the 
American people of present and future generations the benefits of 
an enduring resource of wilderness. "88 Additionally, wilderness areas 
are to be "administered for the use and enjoyment of the American 
people in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use 
and enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection 
of these areas [and] the preservation of their wilderness character 
"89 
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act,90 another statutory 
delegation of public trust duties, protects navigable waters and thus 
embodies the original thrust of the public trust doctrine. This Act 
prohibits the construction of a "bridge, causeway, dam or dike" 
across or in any navigable water of the United States except by 
congressional consent. 91 The Act also prohibits deposits of refuse in 
navigable waters.92 The Corps of Engineers is responsible for imple-
menting the public trust duties imposed by this Act. 93 
Finally, NEPA94 embodies an all-encompassing statutory delega-
tion of public trust duties. Its purpose is to "declare a national policy 
which will encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between 
man and his environment; to promote efforts which will prevent or 
83 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
84 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). These statutes are particularly useful to 
the premise of this Comment because they, or cases involving them, contain explicit trust 
language. For examples of other pre-1970 statutory delegations, see, e.g., The Forest Service 
Organic Act of 1891, 16 U.S.C. §§ 471a-542d (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); The Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act of 1968, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
85 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
86 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
87 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a)(1982). Examples of designated wilderness areas are: Eagles Nest 
Wilderness of Colorado; Petrified Forest National Wilderness of Arizona; Allegheny Islands 
Wilderness of Pennsylvania; River of No Return Wilderness in Idaho; and Ansel Adams 
Wilderness of California. 16 U.S.C. § 1132(e) (1982). 
88 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982)(emphasis added). 
89 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (1982)(emphasis added). See generally Robinson, Wilderness: The 
Last Frontier, 5 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1974). 
00 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
91 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1982). 
92 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1982). See generally Want, Federal Wetlands Law: The Cases and the 
Problems, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
93 33 C.F.R. § 322, app. B (1982). 
94 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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eliminate damage to the health and welfare of man; to enrich the 
understanding of the ecological system and natural resources impor-
tant to the Nation; and to establish a Council on Environmental 
Quality."95 NEPA's express goals are to: 
fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the 
environment for succeeding generations; (2) assure . . . safe, 
healthful, productive and esthetically and culturally pleasing sur-
roundings; (3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the 
environment without ... unintended consequences; (4) preserve 
. . . our national heritage, and maintain . . . an environment 
which supports diversity and variety of individual choice; (5) 
achieve a balance between population and resource use . . .; and 
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the 
maximum attainable recycling of depleted resources. 96 
Although NEP A does not specify congressional intent regarding 
enforcement, courts have interpreted the Act to establish judicially-
enforceable obligations. 97 
In imposing a duty to preserve the "environment" for future gen-
erations, NEP A is a direct and complete codification of the public 
trust doctrine. The statutes discussed thus far have encompassed 
the public trust doctrine as it applies to specific trust property, such 
as: wild free-roaming horses and burros;98 public lands;99 parks;loo 
wilderness areas;101 and navigable waters.102 In contrast, NEPA, in 
a sense a catch-all statute, mandates that all public trust property 
be protected and preserved for present and future generations. 
These public land and natural resource statutes suggest that Con-
gress is aware of its public trust obligations. In fact, some of the 
language in these acts indicates that Congress does indeed take its 
obligations seriously, and wishes to ensure that the public trust 
95 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
96 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b)(1)-4331(b)(6) (1982)(emphasis added). 
97 See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). In Calvert Cliffs', Judge Skelly Wright concluded that NEPA "mandates a particular 
sort of careful and informed decisionmaking process and creates judicially enforceable duties." 
[d. at 1115. For a more in-depth discussion of NEPA, see Murchison, Does NEPA Matter?-
An Analysis of the Historical Development and Contemporary Significance of the National 
Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1984). 
98 The Wild Free-Roaming Horses and Burros Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982). 
99 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & 
Supp. III 1985). 
100 The National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
101 The Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
102 The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1982 & Supp. III 
1985). 
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corpus is protected adequately for present and future generations. 103 
Moreover, as discussed above, 104 several federal administrative agen-
cies already have statutory duties to protect what, under the public 
trust doctrine, is public trust property. This Comment, however, 
posits that it is the public trust beneficiaries' powers to enforce these 
obligations that will make the public trust doctrine an effective tool 
in protecting our nation's natural resources. 
IV. PUBLIC TRUST BENEFICIARIES' RIGHTS AGAINST FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
According to Professor Sax, to be viable, the public trust doctrine 
must encompass a legal right that is: (1) vested in the public; (2) 
enforceable against the government; and (3) harmonious with envi-
ronmental concerns. 105 At the federal level, the public trust doctrine 
has developed primarily as a source of governmental power to control 
public resources. 106 Congress, however, has delegated implicitly both 
the power and the obligation to protect public resources to federal 
administrative agencies via several different statutes.107 The public 
trust doctrine has thus developed to the point where there is at least 
an implicit legal right vested in the public. Therefore, the first of 
Professor Sax's mandates has been met. The question remains, how-
ever, whether the public trust doctrine leads to enforceable rights 
against the federal government. Environmental groups have sought 
to compel federal administrative agencies to honor trust obligations 
imposed by these statutes.108 In addition, courts have held in a few 
cases that the federal government and its agencies have separate 
non-statutory public trust obligations. 109 
A. Enforceability of Trustee Duties Against Federal Agencies By, 
or In Conjunction with, Federal Statutes 
N on-profit environmental groups, among others, have sought to 
compel federal agencies to honor their public trust duties through, 
or in conjunction with, federal statutes. These groups typically argue 
103 See supra notes 66, 72, 76, and 96 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 53-103 and accompanying text. 
106 See Sax, supra note 51, at 474. For the purposes of this Comment, only Sax's first and 
second mandates will be discussed. 
106 See supra notes 38--50 and accompanying text. 
107 See supra notes 51-103 and accompanying text. 
108 See infra notes 110-78 and accompanying text. 
109 See infra notes 179-211 and accompanying text. 
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either that a federal statute itself imposes public trust duties, or 
that public trust duties exist as a supplement to statutory duties. In 
general, courts have been more receptive to the former argument. 
1. The National Park Service Act 
Prior to 1978, the leading case for imposing public trust duties on 
federal agencies in conjunction with the National Park Service Act 
was Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior.11o In that case, the 
Sierra Club, a non-profit environmental group, sued the Department 
of the Interior in 1974 to compel it to exercise its protective powers 
over Redwood National Park. 111 Despite the federal establishment 
of Redwood National Park in 1968, continued logging from adjoining 
private lands within the Redwood Creek watershed threatened to 
destroy parkland redwoods. 112 In Sierra Club I, District Judge 
Sweigert found that the Redwood National Park Act,113 the National 
Park Service Act,114 and the public trust doctrine115 imposed legal 
duties upon the Secretary of the Interior: 
to utilize the specific powers given him whenever reasonably 
necessary for the protection of the park and that any discretion 
vested in the Secretary concerning time, place and specifics of 
the exercise ... [was] subordinate to his paramount legal duty 
imposed, not only under his trust obligation but by the statute 
itself, to protect the park. 116 
The court further found that the complaint was sufficient and there-
fore denied the Secretary's motion to dismiss. ll7 
After Sierra Club I, the Department of the Interior conducted 
further studies of Redwood National Park and attempted to nego-
tiate cooperative agreements with the logging companies whose op-
110 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974) [hereinafter Sierra Club IJ. 
111 Id. at 92-93. 
112 Id. 
113 16 U.S.C. §§ 79a-79j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
114 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-460 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). For a discussion of the Act, see supra notes 
70-73 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the legislative history of the Act and 
its inadequacies as a compromise statute, see Hudson, Sierra Club v. Department of Interior: 
The Fight To Preserve The Redwood National Park, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 781, 794-804 (1978). 
115 In describing the Secretary of the Interior's fiduciary obligations, the court stated: "The 
Secretary is the guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands." 376 F. 
Supp. at 93 (quoting Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891)). For a 
discussion of Knight, see supra note 43 and a~companying text. 
116'376 F. Supp. at 95-96. 
117 I d. at 96. 
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erations were damaging the parkland redwoods. 118 The court main-
tained continuing jurisdiction over this matter and issued two 
additional opinions. In Sierra Club II, Judge Sweigert held that the 
Secretary had acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, and in abuse of his 
discretion by not taking further steps to protect the Park as required 
by his statutory and public trust duties. 119 The court ordered the 
Secretary to take reasonable steps within a reasonable time to pro-
tect the Park. 120 Those steps included: buying land on the periphery 
of the Park; modifying Park boundaries; and resorting to Congress 
to seek appropriation of funds to implement the foregoing steps. 121 
In response to this court order, the Department of the Interior 
submitted to Congress a report setting forth five alternatives for 
protecting the Park. 122 The Department also requested, and was 
denied, Office of Management and Budget funds for implementing 
these alternatives. 123 Finally, the Department suggested that the 
Justice Department commence litigation against _ certain companies 
to restrain their logging practices that were endangering the Park. 124 
In Sierra Club III, the court held that the Department of the 
Interior had, in good faith, attempted to perform its duties within 
the limits of the funds provided by Congress and that "primary 
responsibility for the protection of the Park rest[ed], no longer upon 
Interior, but squarely upon Congress .... "125 The Sierra Club II 
court specifically recognized affirmative public trust duties imposed 
liB Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284, 287-91 (N.D. Cal. 1975) 
[hereinafter Sierra Club II]. Beginning in April 1969, the Secretary of the Interior conducted 
five consecutive studies of the damage to the Park caused by logging operations. These 
included: the Stone Report of 1969, which recommended that buffers be established around 
the perimeters of the Park; the Preliminary Draft Master Plan of 1971, which again stated 
the need for a buffer zone; the National Park Service Proposal of November 1971, which 
recommended special forest management practices, and acquisition of a buffer zone and lands 
along tributary streams; the Earth Satellite Report of 1972, which included aerial documen-
tation of damage to the Redwoods and a list of logging practices which accelerated the erosion 
process; and the Curry Task Force Report of 1975, which recommended cooperative agree-
ments with logging companies, acquisition of a buffer zone, and a stream monitoring system. 
Id. 
119 I d. at 293. 
120 Id. at 294. 
1211d. 
122 See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 173-74 (N.D. Cal. 1976) 
[hereinafter Sierra Club III]. The five proposed alternatives were: "(1) reliance on state 
regulation; (2) cooperative agreements ... ; (3) acquisition of land through leasing and less-
than-fee interests ... ; (4) acquisition of fee interest of land [to enlarge present boundaries] 
... ; and (5) long-range land use planning .... " Id. at 173. 
123 Id. at 173-74. 
124 Id. at 174. 
125 Id. at 175. 
1988] PROTECTING FEDERAL LAND 403 
in conjunction with federal statutes and ordered the Secretary of 
the Interior to honor these duties. 126 The Sierra Club III court, 
however, was only willing to require fulfillment of such duties to the 
extent allowed by financial considerations. 127 
In September 1976, three months after the Sierra Club III deci-
sion, plaintiffs in Friends of Yosemite v. FrizzeW28 sought declara-
tory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory and punitive 
damages, with regard to: construction of certain sanitation and hous-
ing facilities in Yosemite National Park; the firing of three of the 
plaintiffs from employment in Yosemite; and an alleged publicity 
campaign to promote the use of the Park for business conventions. 129 
The Friends of Yosemite claimed that the Secretary of the Interior's 
actions violated the public trust duties imposed upon him under the 
National Park Service Act. 130 They also relied upon both Sierra Club 
I and Sierra Club II to support their contention that a breach of 
this fiduciary duty gives rise to a private cause of action. 131 
In Friends of Yosemite, a California federal district court held 
that, because the National Park Service Act specifically authorized 
construction of sanitation facilities and tourist promotion,132 it was 
unnecessary "to decide whether a private right of action [would] 
exist for a breach of trust under the facts of this case because there 
is no evidence that. . . either the Department of the Interior or the 
National Park Service violated any legal duty. "133 Additionally, the 
court stated that plaintiffs failed to allege any facts indicating the 
Secretary acted "unreasonably, arbitrarily [or] in abuse of discre-
tion. "134 The court further suggested that, even if the federal defen-
dants erred in their decision not to issue an environmental impact 
statement, this error would constitute a violation of NEPA, not a 
breach of trust. 135 
Once the Friends of Yosemite court found that agency actions 
were specifically authorized by a federal statute, it saw no need to 
126 398 F. Supp. at 293-94. 
127 424 F. Supp. at 175. 
128 420 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Friends of Yosemite is "an unincorporated association 
of individuals, many [ofwhoml make considerable use of the camping and recreational facilities 
of Yosemite National Park." [d. at 392 (citation omitted). The defendant in this case, Kent 
Frizzell, was Acting Secretary of the Interior. [d. 
129 [d. at 392. 
130 [d. at 393. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. 
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consider common law duties preempted by that statute. The court 
indicated, therefore, that it would not recognize "fiduciary duties" 
per se, only specific statutory duties. Part of the problem may be 
that the Sierra Club plaintiffs argued, and the court agreed, that 
the Secretary's actions violated both statutory duties and public 
trust duties. 136 The Friends of Yosemite plaintiffs failed to argue 
breach of non-statutory trust duties. Accordingly, once the court 
found that the Secretary's actions were specifically statutorily au-
thorized, it had no alternative but to find for the defendants. 137 
Moreover, on the facts, the Friends of Yosemite plaintiffs had a 
weaker case than the Sierra Club plaintiffs. 
In 1978, Congress, perhaps in response to Sierra Club Ill's mes-
sage,138 amended the Redwood National Park Act to authorize large 
additions of adjoining timberland to the Park. 139 The legislative his-
tory of this amendment indicates a congressional intent to abrogate 
any distinction between statutory and non-statutory public trust 
duties:140 
This restatement of these highest principles of management is 
also intended to serve as the basis for any judicial resolution of 
competing private and public values and interest in the areas 
surrounding Redwood National Park and other areas of the N a-
tional Park System .... The committee [on Energy and Natural 
Resources] has been concerned that litigation with regard to 
Redwood National Park and other areas of the system may have 
blurred the responsibilities articulated by the 1916 Act creating 
the National Park Service . . . . [T]he primary purpose of Sub-
section l(b) which amends the Act of 1970 ... is to refocus and 
insure that the basis for decision-making concerning the National 
Park system continues to be the criteria provided by 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1 [the National Park Service Act] .... 141 
Such language as "the criteria" and "the basis" seems to preclude 
imposition of non-statutory public trust duties with regard to the 
National Park System. 
136 398 F. Supp. at 293. 
137 420 F. Supp. at 393. 
138 The Sierra Club III court held that the Secretary of the Interior's limited actions to 
remediate his breach of trust duties were sufficient given the financial constraints imposed by 
Congress. 424 F. Supp. at 175. 
139 G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW 260 (1981). 
14°Id. at 260; S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977). See also H. REP. No. 581, 
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 463-
95. For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the amendment, see Hudson, supra 
note 114, at 847-56; see also Keiter, supra note 73, at 371-75. 
141 S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8, 13-14 (1977)(emphasis added). 
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In Sierra Club v. Andrus,142 the court interpreted the legislative 
history of the 1978 amendment to the Redwood National Park Act 
to limit the public trust doctrine such that the federal defendants' 
only responsibilities with regard to the National Park System were 
statutorily-imposed ones. 143 In Andrus, the Sierra Club sued the 
Secretary of the Interior, various officials of the National Park Ser-
vice, and the Bureau of Land Management to require them to assert 
and to protect federally-reserved water rights in certain water 
courses located within the National Park System. 144 Plaintiff also 
sought a declaration that such water rights existed. 145 It argued that 
the defendants had failed to fulfill statutory obligations imposed 
under the National Park Service Act, the Federal Lands Policy and 
Management Act of 1976, and other laws. 146 The Sierra Club further 
alleged that the defendants had failed to fulfill public trust obligations 
imposed by these enumerated statutes. 147 
The Andrus court found that: "The legislative history of the 1978 
amendment. . . makes clear that any distinction between 'trust' and 
'statutory' responsiblities in the management of the National Park 
System is unfounded."148 The court, therefore, dismissed the plain-
tiff's breach of trust claims for failure to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted. 149 As to the statutorily-imposed duties, the 
court stated that, because a task force was implementing the very 
action plaintiff sought to compel, the Secretary's decision to refrain 
from litigation over these particular federally-reserved water rights 
had a rational basis. 150 In sum, the court held that the Secretary's 
decision was not arbitrary or capricious, he had not violated any 
142 487 F. Supp. 443 (D. D.C. 1980), aiI'd, Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
143 [d. at 449. 
144 [d. at 445. The water courses are the Escalante River, the Paria River, Kanab Creek, 
and Johnson Wash. [d. Plaintiffs allege that the federal reserved water rights arose by virtue 
of the waters' locations in the Grand Canyon National Park, Glen Canyon National Recreation 
Area, and Bureau of Land Management lands. [d. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 447-49. The other laws that plaintiffs argued imposed statutory obligations upon 
the defendants included: The Grand Canyon National Park Act of 1919, as amended, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 221-228j (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); and The Glen Canyon National Recreational Area Act of 
1972, as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460dd-460dd-9 (1982). 487 F. Supp. at 445. For further 
discussion of the National Park Service Act, see supra notes 70-73 and accompanying text. 
For further discussion of FLPMA, see supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text. 
147 487 F. Supp. at 449. 
148 [d. 
149 [d. at 452. 
150 [d. 
406 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:385 
statutory duties, and he was not subject to any "trust" duties be-
cause such duties were indistinguishable from his statutorily-im-
posed duties. 151 
In sum, prior to Congress' 1978 amendment to the Redwood Na-
tional Park Act, the Sierra Club court was willing to recognize, and 
impose, public trust duties in conjunction with duties imposed by 
the National Park Service Act. 152 In Friends of Yosemite, the same 
court found no need to determine whether plaintiffs had a separate 
cause of action under the public trust doctrine because the defen-
dants' actions were sanctioned specifically by statute. 153 After Con-
gress' 1978 amendment to the Redwood National Park Service Act, 
however, in Sierra Club v. Andrus, the Federal Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia refused to recognize public trust duties 
imposed in conjunction with the National Park Service Act because 
it found the legislative history of the 1978 amendment clearly indi-
cated congressional intent to abrogate, at least with regard to the 
National Park System, any distinction between statutory and non-
statutory public trust duties. 154 
2. The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act 
The Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Actl55 is another federal 
statute through which plaintiffs may seek to establish affirmative 
151 487 F. Supp. at 452. The Sierra Club took a narrow appeal from the district court's 
judgment, appealing only that portion of the decision where the court declined to decide 
whether FLPMA conferred by implication federally-reserved water rights in waters adjacent 
to lands managed by the BLM. See Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981)(The 
Court of Appeals held that FLPMA's mere passage did not result in reserved water rights.). 
See also Conservation Law Foundation v. Clark, 590 F. Supp. 1467 (D. Mass. 1984). In Clark, 
the Conservation Law Foundation (eLF) challenged the National Park Service's plan regu-
lating use of off-road vehicles on the Cape Cod National Sea Shore. Id. at 1470-71. CLF 
argued that the Secretary of the Interior's adoption of the plan violated, inter alia, the 
National Park Service Act and the public trust doctrine. Id. In response to plaintiffs' public 
trust claim, the court stated, in a footnote, that it "recognize[dl the duty of the Secretary of 
the Interior to see that 'none of the public domain is wasted or is disposed of to a party not 
entitled to it.'" Id. at 1480 n.8 (quoting Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 
181 (1891)). However, the court then stated that, in light of the specific statutory mandates 
to protect the seashore, "any further consideration of such general implied public trust duties 
would be inconsequential to the court's ultimate decision." Id. at 1480 n.8. The Clark court, 
therefore, like the Andrus court, refused to impose non-statutory public trust duties when 
there existed specific statutory duties. 
152 376 F. Supp. at 95-96; 398 F. Supp. at 293. 
153 420 F. Supp. at 393. 
154 487 F. Supp. at 449. 
155 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
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federal public trust duties. The Act protects navigable waters and, 
inter alia, prohibits deposits of refuse in navigable waters.l56 
District o/Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc. 157 is an example of a case 
where the plaintiff could have been more successful if it had sought 
to establish public trust duties through the Rivers and Harbors 
Appropriation Act. In 1983, the District of Columbia brought an 
action against Air Florida to recover the costs of emergency services 
and cleanup that resulted from the crash of an Air Florida jet into 
the Rochambeau Memorial Bridge and the Potomac River.l58 The 
District of Columbia, in its appeal from the district court's dismissal 
for failure to state a claim, contended that it had alleged facts suf-
ficient to recover under two legal theories: first, a municipality may 
recover from negligent tortfeasors the costs of "extraordinary" 
emergency services; and second, Air Florida had a duty not to 
interfere with the federal public trust responsibilities for the Poto-
mac River that Congress had delegated implicitly to the District of 
Columbia. 159 
Under its second legal theory, the District contended that, even 
though the United States holds title to that section of the Potomoc 
River and is therefore sovereign trustee, Congress' implicit dele-
gation of its public trust responsibilities to the District, by conferring 
to the District significant control over the river, made the District 
"surrogate trustee. "160 Rather than arguing that the federal govern-
ment's public trust duties to protect navigable waters devolved from 
the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act, the District argued that 
these reponsibilities stemmed from the common law public trust 
doctrine. 161 The court of appeals held that the District of Columbia's 
failure to raise this novel public trust theory in the district court, 
and to allege facts that would have alerted the district court to the 
relevance of the public trust doctrine, justified the appellate court's 
refusal to exercise its discretion to entertain new theories on ap-
peal. 162 
156 For a brief discussion of the Act, see supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
157 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
158 District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., No. 82-2506 (D.D.C. 1983). 
159 District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1984). To support 
its proposition that it was the recipient of Congress' public trust responsibilities for the 
Potomac River, the District of Columbia cited D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-1701-22-1703(a) (1981 
& Supp. 1986), which empowered the District to promulgate and enforce harbor regulations. 
ld. at 1081 n.ll. 
160 750 F.2d at 1081. 
161ld. 
162ld. at 1078-79. 
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Although the appellate court affirmed the dismissal, it took the 
opportunity to make a thorough analysis of the public trust doctrine's 
history. 163 After making this analysis, the court stated two additional 
bases to reinforce its decision not to consider the District's public 
trust claim. l64 First, the court noted that the United States was not 
a party to the action, and stated that resolution of these issues should 
be left to a case where the District of Columbia has an opportunity 
to join the United States. l65 Second, the court stated that Congress 
had already legislated extensively regarding many public trust in-
terests and such legislation included, inter alia, the Rivers and 
Harbors Appropriation Act. 166 The court expressed concern that this 
legislation may preempt all, or part, of the alleged federal common 
law duties. 167 Although the Air Florida court was obviously in-
trigued by the concept of a federal common law public trust doctrine, 
its decision seems to follow the Sierra Club v. Andrus rationale. l68 
That is, if there are public trust duties, they are indistinguishable 
from, and may only be imposed through, related statutory duties. 169 
3. The Wilderness Act 
The most recent attempt to impose public trust obligations upon 
federal administrative agencies in conjunction with a federal statute 
is Sierra Club v. Block. 170 In Block, the Sierra Club asserted that 
federal defendantsl71 failed to claim and protect federally-reserved 
water rights in designated wilderness areas in violation of their 
duties under the Wilderness Act to protect and preserve wilderness 
areas for the benefit of present and future Americans, and their 
additional duties under the public trust doctrine "to protect and 
preserve [public] lands for the public's common heritage."172 The 
federal district court found that a common law public trust duty did 
163 [d. at 1080-84. 
164 [d. at 1085. 
165 [d. 
166 [d. at 1085-86. 
167 [d. 
168 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), afI'd, Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. 
169 750 F.2d at 1085-86. 
170 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), later proceeding, Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 
1490 (D. Colo. 1987). 
171 The federal defendants included the Secretary of Agriculture, the Chief of the Forest 
Service, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Director of the National Park Service. 
172 622 F. Supp. at 846, 866. For a brief discussion of the Wilderness Act, see supra notes 
86-89 and accompanying text. 
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exist. 173 The court stated that: "Consistent with the right to use the 
lands for public purposes, the government has a duty under this 
doctrine to protect and preserve the lands for the public's common 
heritage."174 The Block court went on to state, however, that it was 
not for the courts, but for Congress, to say how the trust should be 
administered. 175 The court cited Sierra Club v. Andrus176 in support 
of its determination that congressional statutory directives com-
prised all the federal agency defendants' public trust responsibili-
ties.177 The court further stated that, because the Wilderness Act 
itself imposed public trust duties, it was unnecessary to resort to a 
common law public trust doctrine to assert protection of these public 
trust resources. 178 
The line of cases examined thus far indicates that courts have been 
unwilling to impose public trust duties except in conjunction with a 
federal statute or as required by a statute itself. As discussed in the 
next section, however, there remains the possibility that public trust 
beneficiaries could enforce public trust duties against the federal 
government without reference to a federal statute. 
B. Enforceability of Federal Agencies' Trustee Duties Without 
Reference to Federal Statutes 
Although courts, in general, have been unwilling to impose non-
statutory public trust duties against the federal government, three 
recent cases indicate that courts may be more willing to impose such 
duties. 179 
173 622 F. Supp. at 866. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. 
176 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), a/I'd, Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
177 622 F. Supp. at 866. 
178 [d. The court held that federal-reserved water rights existed in these Colorado wilderness 
areas and remanded the action to the federal defendants to comply with their statutory 
obligations with regard to these water rights and to submit to the court a plan for complying 
with these obligations. 622 F. Supp. at 865-66. In a subsequent opinion, Sierra Club v. Lyng, 
661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987), the same judge, District Judge Kane, held, inter alia, that 
the federal defendants' plan to comply with their statutory duties to protect the water 
resources was inadequate and that the portion of the plan listing alternative means of pro-
tecting the water rights without seeking adjUdication of the rights constituted an abuse of 
discretion under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). [d. at 1501-1502. 
179 In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); United States v. 1.58 
Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981); City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 
632 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Cal. 1986), later proceeding, 635 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
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In In re Steuart Transportation Co., 180 the federal government 
and Virginia sued the owner of a tank barge for compensatory dam-
ages for damage to migratory fowl, statutory penalties, and cleanup 
costs resulting from an oil spill in Chesapeake Bay. 181 The defendant, 
Steuart Transportation Co., moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that neither the federal nor the state government could maintain the 
action because neither owned the birds. 182 The federal district court 
agreed that neither owned the birds, but ruled that: "Under the 
public trust doctrine, the State of Virginia and the United States 
have the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's 
interest in national wildlife resources. Such right does not derive 
from ownership of the resources but from a duty owing to the 
people. "183 The opinion does not, however, offer any analysis as to 
why the common law public trust doctrine creates a right in, and 
imposes a duty upon, the federal government. l84 Its value in clari-
fying the federal public trust doctrine, therefore, is limited. 
The second recent decision that suggests a willingness upon the 
part of the judiciary to recognize non-statutory federal public trust 
duties is United States v. 1.58 Acres of Land. 185 In that case, the 
United States sought to condemn and take certain waterfront prop-
erty in fee simple for use in redeveloping a Coast Guard Support 
Center and "for such other uses as may be authorized by Executive 
Order. "186 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts objected. 187 The 
state contended that the language "for such other uses" could allow 
the United States to convey fee simple to the submerged lands to 
private individuals and this would "vitiate the perpetual public trust 
that is impressed upon land below the low water mark and which is 
administered by the Commonwealth. "188 
After a thorough analysis of the development of the public trust 
doctrine, the 1.58 Acres of Land court held that the United States 
could take the property in fee simple, but subject to certain restric-
tions. 189 The court stated that, even though the "state's administra-
180 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980). 
lSI Id. at 39. 
182 Id. 
183Id. at 40 (emphasis added). 
184 In District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., discussed supra at notes 157-69 and 
accompanying text, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals criticized In re Steuart Trans-
portation Co. for its lack of analysis. 750 F. 2d at 1083. 
185 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981). 
188 I d. at 121. 
187 Id. 
188Id. 
189 Id. at 124-25. 
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tion of the trust is subject to paramount rights of the federal gov-
ernment to administer its trust ... ,"190 neither the state's nor the 
federal government's public trust responsibilities were destroyed by 
the taking.191 Each sovereign was restricted, therefore, in its ability 
to abdicate its jus publicum in the submerged lands. 192 U.S. v. 1.58 
Acres of Land stands for the proposition that, even in the absence 
of a statutory mandate, both federal and state governments are 
charged with public trust duties with respect to submerged lands. 193 
In a third recent case, City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards 
COrp.,194 a court not only recognized the federal government's non-
statutory trust duties but also affirmatively imposed such duties on 
the federal government. 195 The case involved a title dispute over 4.9 
acres of land bordering an army base on an estuary in Alameda, 
California. l96 When California became a state in 1850, it succeeded 
the federal government as public trustee of the land located between 
the high and low water mark. 197 United States engineers filled a 
large portion of the land between 1870 and 1913. 198 In 1913, Califor-
nia, by statute, transferred title to the land to Alameda which, by 
city ordinance, granted the land back to the United States in 1931. 199 
In 1943, the United States condemned the remaining portion of the 
land at issue that Alameda had neglected to convey in 1931. 200 Then, 
in 1970, the United States purportedly sold the land to Todd Ship-
yards, a private corporation.201 
Alameda argued that, because the land was subject to the public 
trust, the conveyance to Todd Shipyards was void and that the land 
should revert to the City.202 The court held that, because the public 
trust doctrine bars alienation of trust land to private parties without 
legislative permission, the United States lacked the authority to 
convey the land to Todd Shipyards and the conveyance was void. 203 
190 I d. at 124. 
191 Id. at 124-25. 
192Id. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text for a definition of jus publicum. 
19" I d. at 124-25. 
194 632 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Cal. 1986). The court resolved certain issues in this opinion, 
resolved other issues in a subsequent opinion, 635 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986), and will 
address the remaining issues in an opinion yet to be written. 
195 632 F. Supp. at 341. 
196 I d. at 335. 
197Id. 
198Id. 
199 Id. 
200 I d. at 336. 
201 I d. at 335. 
202 Id. 
203 I d. at 335-37. 
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As a result, legal title reverted to the United States. 204 Further, 
even with regard to the filled land, the United States "was obligated 
to hold the land in trust for navigation and public use. "205 As to the 
portion of the land acquired by condemnation, the court, in a second 
opinion, directed the parties to submit affidavits showing whether 
that land was "subject to the action of the tides"206 at the time of 
condemnation.207 The court cited United States v. 1.58 Acres of 
Land208 for the proposition that, if the land was tideland at the time 
of condemnation, then "[t]he United States may not abdicate the 
role of trustee for the public .... "209 The City of Alameda court, 
therefore, not only recognized the federal government's non-statu-
tory public trust duties, by requiring the government to hold the 
land for a public use, but it also affirmatively imposed trust duties 
by voiding the government's attempt to breach its trust duties. 210 
In the foregoing three recent cases, courts have suggested that 
the federal government may be subject to non-statutory trust du-
ties. 211 These cases may indicate that the judiciary will impose sep-
arate public trust duties on federal agencies, at least where there 
are no statutory duties to protect the trust resources at issue. At 
the state case-law level, beneficiaries of the public trust have suc-
cessfully forced both state governments and their agencies to honor 
non-statutorily-imposed public trust duties. 212 At the federal level, 
however, as discussed previously,213 federal courts generally will not 
impose non-statutory public trust duties. 214 Yet, they will, on occa-
sion, compel federal agencies to fulfill their statutory trust duties. 215 
204Id. at 337. 
205 I d. at 341. The court held that "[m]ere filling does not remove the public trust obligations 
[of the United States] .... " Id. 
206 635 F. Supp. at 1451. 
207Id. 
208 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981). 
209Id. at 1450. 
210 632 F. Supp. at 336-37, 341; 635 F. Supp. at 1450. 
211 In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Va. 1980); United States v. 1.58 
Acres of Land, 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981); City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 
632 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Cal. 1986), later proceeding, 635 F. Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal. 1986). 
212 See, e.g., Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 
(1969)(Department of Public Works enjoined under public trust doctrine from building highway 
across meadow); City of Zumbrota v. Strafford Western Emigration Co., 290 N.W.2d 621 
(Minn. 1980)(city enjoined under public trust doctrine from selling public square to developer); 
Stephenson v. County of Monroe, 43 A.D.2d 897, 351 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1974)(county enjoined 
under public trust doctrine from using park as sanitary landfill). 
213 See supra notes 110-78 and accompanying text. 
214 See supra notes 128-78 and accompanying text. 
215Id. 
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Unless the public trust doctrine, whether statutory or non-statutory, 
is strengthened,216 however, given the problems that are analyzed 
in the next section of enforcing even statutorily-imposed public trust 
duties, there is little likelihood of the public trust doctrine becoming 
a potent tool to make federal agencies protect trust resources. 
V. PROBLEMS WITH JUDICIAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES' 
PUBLIC TRUST RESOURCE DECISIONS 
Congress delegated its public trust powers and duties to federal 
administrative agencies through numerous statutes.217 Various ben-
eficiaries of this public trust have attempted to compel federal ad-
ministrative agencies to fulfill their trust obligations through legal 
actions. 218 Each of these plaintiffs has encountered procedural and 
substantive hurdles to achieving their goals of governmental ac-
countability for environmental decision-making. These hurdles stem 
from judicial review of agency decisions regarding the use of public 
trust resources. The problems plaintiffs have encountered include: 
judicial deference to agency expertise;219 the public trust doctrine's 
lack of clear definition, thus the difficulty of implementing its stan-
dards;220 and, the judiciary's blind deference to federal agencies' 
misuse of the federal mUltiple-use sustained-yield acts. 221 
A. Judicial Deference to Agency Expertise 
The Administrative Procedure Act222 and the Mandamus Act223 
give federal district courts jurisdiction to compel a federal employee, 
officer or agency to perform a duty owed to plaintiffs. The two 
exceptions to this jurisdiction are: (1) where there exists clear and 
convincing evidence that Congress intended to preclude judicial re-
view; and, (2) where agency action is committed to agency discre-
tion. 224 In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,225 the 
216 For a discussion of potential means to strengthen the public trust doctrine, see infra 
notes 260--356 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 51-103 and accompanying text. 
218 See supra notes 110-78 and accompanying text. 
219 See infra notes 222--39 and accompanying text. 
220 See infra notes 240-43 and accompanying text. 
221 See infra notes 244--59 and accompanying text. 
2225 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 706(1) provides that a reviewing 
court may "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." [d. § 706(1). 
223 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1982). 
224 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1)-70l(a)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
225 401 U. S. 402 (1971). 
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Supreme Court emphasized that the second of these exceptions is 
very narrow. 226 The Court stated that there is a basic presumption 
in favor of judicial review, and that the exception is applicable only 
in "rare instances. "227 
Once a court determines that an action is reviewable, it must then 
apply a standard of review. Agency actions must be supported by 
substantial evidence228 and, inter alia, must not be "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with 
law. "229 However, it is very difficult to establish that agency action 
has met these conditions. Once a court has determined that there is 
some rational basis for an agency's decision, the court very often 
defers to the agency's expertise.230 Courts generally have been hes-
itant to override administrative agencies' decisions for fear of sub-
stituting their own judgments for the agencies. '231 
It is also a well-established principle that an agency's interpreta-
tion of its enabling statute and its regulations is entitled to great 
deference. 232 The Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of the 
National Park Service Act, for example, would be accorded great 
deference. Courts have also deferred to agency decisions because 
the government, as proprietor of the public lands, is supposedly in 
the best position to decide the lands' most beneficial use.233 For 
example, in Sierra Club v. Andrus,234 a federal district court stated: 
"The standard of review is a highly deferential standard which pre-
sumes agency action to be valid, forbids a court's substituting its 
226 401 u.s. at 410 (citations omitted). 
227 [d. 
228 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1982). 
229 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See generally Gardner & Greenberger, Judicial Review of 
Administrative Action and Responsible Government, 63 GEO. L.J. 7 (1974). 
230 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1408 (9th Cir. 1985) ("Traditionally, an 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to a high degree of deference. "); 
Hawaiian Electric Co. v. United States EPA, 723 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1984); Cities of Batavia 
v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 672 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Where an agency has been 
assigned principal policy development responsibility, a healthy dose of deference is in order.). 
See generally 5 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29:16 (1984). 
231 See, e.g., Harley-Davison Motor Co. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 228 (D.C. Cir. 1979)(where an 
agency has demonstrated a rational basis for action, a court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the agency); Ashwood Manor Civic Ass'n v. Dole, 619 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Pa. 1985), 
afi'd, 779 F.2d 41 (3d Cir. 1985), crn. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986). 
232 See, e.g., Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,16-18, reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 989 (1965); Organized 
Fishermen of Florida v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 805, 811 (S.D. Fla. 1984), aff'd, 775 F.2d 1544 
(11th Cir. 1985), crn. denied, 106 S.Ct. 2890 (1986). 
233 See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 146. 
234 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd, Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). 
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judgment for that of the agency, and requires affirmance if a rational 
basis exists for the agency's decision."235 In keeping with this stan-
dard, the Andrus court upheld the Secretary of the Interior's deci-
sion not to sue to protect federally-reserved water rights. 236 Also, 
in Lara v. Secretary of the Interior,237 a mining claim case, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the Secretary's expertise in 
determining what constitutes a "mineral discovery. "238 Specifically 
with regard to the public trust doctrine, courts have held that it is 
not for the courts to say how the trust will be administered. 239 In 
practice, therefore, judicial deference to agency expertise impedes 
judicial imposition of public trust duties. 
B. The Public Trust Doctrine's Lack of Definition 
Still another obstacle to a court's imposition of public trust duties 
is the duties' lack of clear definition. Courts have historically used 
the public trust doctrine to impose the public trust duties of protec-
tion and preservation of natural resources for future generations 
where they saw such a need.240 Although a certain degree of judicial 
flexibility may broaden the doctrine's applicability, it also hinders its 
imposition. "Protection" and "preservation" of trust property are 
broad terms. It is often easier to apply the Administrative Procedure 
Act's standard of requiring agency decisions to have some, if little, 
rational basis241 and to look to a statute's legislative history for an 
appropriate standard of review. Moreover, given that federal envi-
ronmental law is rife with statutes that ostensibly already protect 
the same public trust resources that the public trust doctrine pro-
tects, it is difficult to justify the need for imposing additional non-
statutory duties via judicial review. 
235 487 F. Supp. at 450. 
236 I d. at 452. 
237 820 F.2d 1535 (9th Cir. 1987). 
238 I d. at 1542. 
239 United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16,29-30 (citing Light v. United States, 
220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911)); Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842, 866 (D. Colo. 1985), later 
proceeding, Sierra Club v. Lyng, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987). 
240 Historically, the public trust doctrine applied to submerged lands between the high and 
low water mark and to navigable waters. The public trust doctrine has been used, however, 
to protect a wide assortment of public land resources. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 
519 (1896)(wildlife); Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 
(1969)(meadow); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 
(1966)(parklands); City of Zumbrota v. Strafford Western Emigration Co., 290 N.W.2d 621 
(Minn. 1980)(public square). 
241 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See supra notes 228-30 and accompanying text. 
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Under the Reagan Administration, however, trust resources are 
not as well protected as they would be if the agencies' decisions were 
attacked under a more potent public trust doctrine.242 This is due to 
courts' tendency to defer to agency expertise.243 This is also due to 
the fact that the public trust doctrine encompasses values not nec-
essarily included in federal statutes or considered a necessary com-
ponent of federal agency decisions. These public trust values include 
preservation for future generations, preference for non-economic 
uses, consideration of long-term, as opposed to short-term, goals and 
aesthetics. 
C. Judicial Deference to Federal Agencies' Misuse of the Federal 
Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Acts 
Furthermore, the current scheme of federal statutes is insufficient 
to protect adequately trust resources due to the judiciary's blind 
deference to federal agencies' misuse of the multiple-use sustained-
yield policy of federal land use designation. This policy is embodied 
in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960 (MUSY) and in the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA).244 
MUSY directs the Secretary of Agriculture, through the Forest 
Service, to "develop and administer the renewable surface resources 
of the national forests for multiple use and sustained yield of the 
several products and services obtained therefrom."245 This means, 
for example, that the Forest Service must decide what percentage 
of forestland will be used as parkland and what percentage will be 
used for lumber. The Act conveys broad discretion to the Forest 
Service to decide the "proper mix of uses. "246 The Act requires the 
Forest Service to give due consideration to the various competing 
uses. 247 Once a court is satisfied that the Forest Service had consid-
242 See supra note 12. 
24a See supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text. 
244 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982); 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). 
245 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982). 
246 16 U.S.C. §§ 529, 531 (1982). See also Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 123 (D. 
Alaska 1971). The case involved an action by the Sierra Club to enjoin the sale of timber from 
the Tongass National Forest and the issuance of a patent of the land for timber harvesting. 
Plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the Secretary of the Department of Agriculture and the 
other federal defendants failed to consider and to balance non-economic uses of the land, such 
as "outdoor recreation, watershed, wildlife and fish uses .... " [d. at 106. In dicta, the district 
court stated that the Forest Service had wide discretion to decide the proper mix of uses 
under MUSY. [d. at 123. The court held, inter alia, that laches barred plaintiffs' claims. [d. 
at 123-24. 
247 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982). 
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ered all competing uses, MUSY forbids the court to take any further 
action and thus substitute the court's decision for the Secretary's 
determination of the best use for the land. 248 For example, in Na-
tional Wildlife Federation v. United States Forest Service , 249 a fed-
eral district court held that the Forest Service's decision to approve 
timber harvesting in the Siuslaw National Forest, despite damaged 
soil, watershed and fish habitats from prior timber harvests, had not 
violated, and was in keeping with, the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield 
Act of 1960.250 
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA) 
directs the Secretary of the Interior to "manage the public lands 
under principles of multiple use and sustained yield. "251 This means 
that the Secretary must decide which combination of uses of public 
lands will "best meet the present and future needs of the American 
people .... "252 Therefore, the Secretary must balance revenue-
producing uses against non-revenue-producing uses. 253 
Although the two multiple-use acts254 specifically state that federal 
agencies are not to give preference to economic uses over non-
economic uses,255 in reality this is exactly what is happening.256 Much 
248 Id. 
249 592 F. Supp. 931 (D. Or. 1984). 
250 592 F. Supp. at 938-39. The court held, however, that the federal defendants' decision 
not to prepare an environmental impact statement was unreasonable and issued an injunction 
enjoining the sale of timber until the defendants prepared such a statement. I d. at 944-45. 
251 43 U. S. C. § 1732(a) (1982). 
252 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1982). 
253 Id. 
254 Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1982); Federal Land 
Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1982). 
255 16 U.S.C. § 531 (1982); 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c). "[C]onsideration [must be] given to the 
relative values of the various resources and not necessarily the combination of uses that will 
give the greatest dollar return." 16 U.S.C. § 531(A). 
256 For example, in a recent Interior Board of Appeals case, Sierra Club Legal Defense 
Fund, Inc., 92 Interior Dec. 37, 84 LB. L.A. 311 (Jan. 7, 1985), an administrative judge 
affirmed the BLM's decision to deny the Sierra Club's protest against the issuance of 118 oil 
and gas leases in areas of critical concern in the California Desert Conservation Area. 92 
Interior Dec. at 38, 46. See also Oakes, Hodel Blunders as He Squanders the Nation's 
Resources, L.A. Daily J., May 20, 1987, at 4, col. 3 ("Hodel's two most recent violations of 
the trust are separate but related. The first was to throw open to oil extractions the entire 
coastal plain of the Artic National Wildlife Refuge in northeastern Alaska, the only place in 
North America where the complete range of Artic ecosystems is still intact. The second, a 
week later, was Hodel's decision to open for oil and gas leasing millions of acres of the most 
environmentally sensitive offshore areas along the Atlantic, Pacific and Alaska coasts."); 
FRIENDS OF THE EARTH, RONALD REAGAN & THE AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT 6 (1982) ("The 
Reagan Administration has made a mockery of the multiple-use/sustained-yield concept that 
governs public lands. It has put huge amounts of the nation's coal, oil and lumber up for sale 
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of this imbalance may be the result of political pressure exerted on 
the Forest Service and the Secretary of the Interior. 257 This pressure 
is created by a statutory mechanism that causes revenues produced 
by natural resources to be funneled back to the local government 
where the federal land is located. 258 Therefore, rather than protect 
and preserve public land and its natural resources, the Forest Ser-
vice and the Secretary of the Interior, under the guise of the mul-
tiple-use statutes, favor economic exploitation of this land and its 
resources. 259 
In sum, although public trust duties are incorporated into a net-
work of federal environmental statutes, the practice of judicial de-
ference to agencies, the public trust doctrine's lack of clear definition, 
and the agencies' current multiple-use policy undermine much of the 
efficacy of these statutes. These problems may be overcome by 
strengthening and clarifying the public trust doctrine into a viable 
tool against federal administrative agencies' failure to protect and 
preserve public trust resources. This newly-strengthened tool could 
be useful in enforcing both statutory and non-statutory public trust 
duties. 
VI. POTENTIAL MEANS TO STRENGTHEN AND IMPLEMENT THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE 
This section first addresses the various ways in which the public 
trust doctrine may be strengthened to increase its effectiveness. It 
will then suggest ways in which plaintiffs can use a more powerful 
doctrine to ensure protection of natural resources under the control 
of federal administrative agencies. 
at bargain basement prices, without considering the long-term consequences, or showing the 
need for this massive transfer of public resources to private hands."). 
257 See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 139. 
258 ld. at 139. The Forest Service Organic Act of 1891 states that: 
[Tlwenty-five per centum of all moneys received during any fiscal year from each 
national forest [from e.g. sales of, e.g., logs, ties, poles, posts, cordwood, pulpwood, 
and other forest productsl shall be paid, at the end of each year, by the Secretary of 
the Treasury to the State ... in which such national forest is situated, to be expended 
as the State . . . legislature may prescribe for the benefit of the public schools and 
public roads of the county or counties in which such national forest is situated .... 
16 U.S.C. § 500 (1982). For additional discussion of the problems caused by the multiple-use 
philosophy, see A. REITZE, supra note 1, ch. 5 at 18-19 and ch. 6 at 4-5. 
259 See supra note 256. 
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A. Methods for Strengthening the Public Trust Doctrine 
1. Analogize to Classic and Charitable Trust Law 
Part of the difficulty that courts have in applying the public trust 
doctrine is its lack of clearly definable terms. If plaintiffs seeking to 
preserve trust resources clearly delineate public trustees' fiduciary 
duties, then they will have a better chance of persuading a court to 
enforce such duties. 260 Clarification would facilitate the enforcement 
of both statutory and non-statutory public trust duties. 
To clarify, and thereby strengthen public trust law, plaintiffs could 
rely on definitions and standards from classic trust law. 261 The RES-
TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS defines a trust as a "fiduciary re-
lationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom 
the title to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the 
property for the benefit of another person . . . . "262 The law of trusts 
demands of the trustee, as a fiduciary, "an unusually high standard 
of ethical or moral conduct .... "263 Trustees have a duty to protect 
trust property and to "do all acts necessary for the preservation of 
the trust res which would be performed by a reasonably prudent 
man. "264 In preserving the trust property, trustees must act in good 
faith,265 prudently,266 diligently,267 and loyally,268 and must defend 
actions against the trust. 269 If trustees are given the express power 
to sell the trust property, or if they gain judicial approval, they have 
260 Berlin, Roisman & Kessler, Law in Action: The Trust Doctrine in LAW AND THE EN-
VIRONMENT 166, 171 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970) [hereinafter Berlin]. "With 
specifically defined trust duties and an identifiable trustee, those who seek to protect the 
property will have a much firmer basis for arguing that a governmental agency has specific 
duties with respect to the property and has an affirmative duty to preserve the trust property 
and to avoid a wasting of its assets." I d. at 171. 
261 For affirmation of the classic trust theory's potential for strengthening protection of 
public trust property, see Cohen, The Constitution, The Public Trust Doctrine and The 
Environment, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 388, 392. For criticism of parallels drawn to classic trust 
law, see Nanda & Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to International 
Environmental Protection, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 291, 296-97 n.32 (1976). 
262 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959). 
263 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. 1965). 
264 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2d ed. 1960)(emphasis added). 
265 I d. § 544. 
266 Id. § 612. 
267Id. § 541. 
268 I d. § 543. 
269 Id. § 581. 
420 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 15:385 
a duty to exercise reasonable care and prudence in the sale of the 
trust property.270 To decide whether to exercise a power to sell, 
trustees must consider both the effect of the sale on the trust's 
beneficiaries and whether it is in the beneficiaries' best interests.271 
If trustees breach any of their fiduciary duties, beneficiaries may 
seek, among other remedies, to enjoin trustees' actions. 272 Once trust 
law preferences for preservation of the trust273 and prohibition of 
invading the trust274 are established in court, the burden of proof 
shifts to the "despoilers" to prove the necessity of despoiling the 
trust cOrpUS. 275 These classic trust law definitions and standards 
clearly set forth the respective roles of trustee and beneficiary that 
the public trust doctrine lacks. Reliance on the classic trust model 
can thus strengthen the vague and amorphous rights and duties of 
the public trust doctrine. 276 
To further clarify the public trust doctrine, plaintiffs could also 
analogize public trust law to charitable trust law. 277 A charitable 
trust is a trust established for a charitable purpose278 and for the 
benefit of the community.279 A purpose is "charitable" if "its accom-
plishment is of such social interest to the community as to justify 
permitting property to be devoted to the purpose in perpetuity."28O 
Whenever it is possible to continue the original charitable purpose 
of the trust, the legislature may not modify it.281 The United States 
has the capacity to hold property as trustee in a charitable trust. 282 
Persons with special interest have standing to sue to enforce char-
itable trusts. 283 
270 [d. § 744. 
271 [d. 
272 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 861 (2d ed. 1962). 
273 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2d ed. 1960). 
274 G. BOGERT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS 262-63 (4th ed. 1963). 
275 Cohen, supra note 261, at 392. 
276 [d. 
277 Analogy to charitable trust law has also been suggested as a means of clarifying NEPA. 
See Comment, Judicial Review of Compliance With the National Environmental Policy Act: 
An Opportunity for Rule of Reason, 12 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 743, 748-55 (1985). 
278 4 A. SCOTT, LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 348, 368 (2d ed. 1956). 
279 [d. § 364. 
280 [d. § 368. Also, a charitable trust may continue to exist beyond the period of the rule of 
perpetuities. [d. § 365. 
281 [d. § 367.3. 
282 [d. § 378. 
283 [d. § 391. For a general discussion of standing in environmental suits, see Stone, SHOULD 
TREES HAVE STANDING? Revisited: How far will law and morals reach? A pluralist per-
spective, 59 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1985). 
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Because federal agencies are de facto trustees of federal public 
land and its resources, courts should be receptive to the premise 
that federal agencies, as public trust trustees, are subject to the 
same fiduciary standard as other trustees. According to one com-
mentator's view of the public trust doctrine, the trust corpus should 
be natural resources, as defined by conservation groups and ecolo-
gists, the trustee should be the government department with the 
clearest responsibility for taking the desired action, and the benefi-
ciary should be any citizen or group that believes its trust interests 
are not being protected adequately.284 Classic and charitable trust 
law thoroughly delineate the duties a fiduciary owes to beneficiaries. 
If plaintiffs are able to point to specific breaches of the public trust 
doctrine by using classic and charitable trust language, courts may 
be more willing to impose public trust obligations on federal agencies 
than they have evinced to date. Moreover, judicial imposition of a 
fiduciary standard of duty may subject agencies to a stricter scrutiny 
than they would receive under the Administrative Procedure Act. 285 
Therefore, analogy to classic and charitable trust law may clarify 
the duties owed by federal agencies, provide the courts with a clearly 
defined standard, and ultimately, strengthen the public trust doc-
trine's viability as a tool to ensure agency accountability for public 
lands. 
2. Determine the Public Trust Doctrine's Position in Modern 
Jurisprudence 
Another method of strengthening the public trust doctrine, and 
increasing its applicability, would be to determine the doctrine's 
position in modern jurisprudence; that is, to decide whether it is 
federal common law, statutory law, or whether it is constitutionally-
based. As discussed previously,286 the public trust doctrine developed 
at the federal common law level as a justification for federal agencies' 
control over federal public lands and their resources. 287 
In recent cases, environmental groups have attempted to use the 
public trust doctrine, along with federal statutes incorporating public 
trust ideals, as a source of enforceable fiduciary duties.288 In Illinois 
284 See Berlin, supra note 260, at 178. 
285 For a brief discussion of the Administrative Procedure Act, see supra notes 222--39 and 
accompanying text. 
286 See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra notes 110-78 and accompanying text. 
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Central,289 the Supreme Court held that, under the public trust 
doctrine, the Illinois legislature could not abdicate its trustee powers 
over submerged lands "except as to such parcels as are used in 
promoting the interests of the public therein, or can be disposed of 
without any substantial impairment of the public interest .... "290 
Under the Illinois Central rationale, in certain circumstances, the 
public trust doctrine supersedes state statutes. If plaintiffs could 
establish that the Illinois Central principle applies to federal stat-
utes then the public trust doctrine would become a powerful tool for 
restraining Congress from abusing public lands. With this issue in 
mind, several commentators have questioned whether the public 
trust doctrine has any constitutional basis. 291 If constitutionally-
grounded, the public trust doctrine could supersede federal statutes 
and thus become a potent plaintiffs' weapon. 
The Property Clause of the Constitution states that "[t]he Con-
gress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules 
and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belong-
ing to the United States. "292 Courts throughout American jurispru-
dence have cited the Property Clause as the federal government's 
source of power over federal lands. For example, in Utah Power & 
Light Co. v. United States , 293 the Supreme Court, citing the United 
State's power to control its lands under the Property Clause, ordered 
Utah Power & Light Co. to compensate the United States for its 
use of certain forest reservations in Utah to generate electric 
power.294 Also, in Kleppe v. New Mexico,295 the Court stated: "Al-
though the Property Clause does not authorize 'an exercise of gen-
eral control over public policy in a State,' it does permit 'an exercise 
of the complete power over particular public property entrusted to 
it. "'296 The Court held that the Property Clause gives Congress the 
289 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
290 [d. at 453. 
291 See, e.g., Wilkinson supra note 5, at 307; H. Althaus, Public Trust Rights 75-78 (Nov. 
3, 1978) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the U.S. Dep't of the Interior). For general 
discussion of congressional authorities under the Property Clause, see generally Glicksman, 
Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the Public Lands: The Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS 
L. J. 1,57-64 (1984); Note, The Scop(3 of Congress' Constitutional Power Under the Property 
Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Purpose of National Parks and 
Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1984). 
292 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, c1.2. 
293 243 U.S. 389 (1917). 
294 [d. at 411. 
295 426 U. S. 529, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873 (1976). 
296 [d. at 540 (citing United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940), reh'g 
denied, 310 U.S. 657 (1940». 
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power to protect wildlife on public lands.297 In a recent case, United 
States v. Ruby Co., 298 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted 
the concept that the public trust doctrine is constitutionally-based 
in the Property Clause.299 The Ruby Co. opinion cites the Property 
Clause to support its statement that "public lands are held in trust 
by the federal government for all the people."30o Unfortunately, in a 
subsequent opinion, State of Nevada v. United States,30l the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed, but did not specifically address, a lower court's 
opinion that "[t]he the responsibility of Congress to utilize the coun-
try's assets in a way that it decides is best for the future of the 
nation is a sort of trust, but not in the sense that a private trustee 
holds for the benefit of a trust's beneficiaries. "302 The federal district 
court held that, under FLPMA and the Property Clause, the Sec-
retary of the Interior has the power to impose a moratorium on the 
disposal of federal lands in Nevada. 303 The Court of Appeals held 
that because the Secretary rescinded the moratorium, the action was 
moot and affirmed the district court's dismissal. 304 
Therefore, although courts have invoked the Property Clause as 
the source of the federal government's power over federal public 
land, courts do not yet use the Property Clause as a source of trust 
beneficiaries' power to impose public trust duties and thus to base 
the doctrine in the Constitution. Additionally, there is no indication 
297 426 U.S. at 546. See also United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27, 41, reh'g denied, 
332 U.S. 787, supp. opinion, 332 U.S. 804 (1947) (Under the Property Clause, the federal 
government has paramount rights to submerged land off the coast of California.); United 
States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 31~2, reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 657 (1940) (Court 
upheld the United States' power over public lands under the Property Clause and enjoined 
San Francisco from allowing a private utility to use water from a national park to generate 
electricity); U.S. v. Gratiot, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526, 537~ (1840) (Court cited the Property 
Clause as source of President's power to lease public land). 
298 588 F.2d 697 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). 
299 [d. at 704. 
300 [d. The Ruby Co. case involved a title dispute between the United States and a patentee's 
successors in interests. An 1877 survey of certain lands along the Snake River in Idaho that 
established grossly erroneous meander lines resulted in the the omission of fourteen to sixteen 
thousand acres of land from the original survey. The federal government sued to quiet title 
in these omitted lands. The circuit court held that this land "belongs to all the people of the 
United States" and is held in trust for them by the federal government. [d. at 705. The court 
held, therefore, in favor of the government. [d. 
SOl 512 F. Supp. 166 (D. Nev. 1981), a/I'd, 699 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1983). 
302 512 F. Supp. at 172. See also Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 277 (1954) (Reed, J., 
concurring). "The United States holds resources and territory in trust for its citizens in one 
sense, but not in the sense that a private trustee holds for a cestui que trust. The responsibility 
of Congress is to utilize the assets that come into its hands as sovereign in the way that it 
decides is best for the future of the Nation. That is what it has done here." [d. at 277. 
303 [d. 
304 699 F.2d at 487-88. 
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that the framers of the Constitution intended the Property Clause 
to incorporate explicitly the public trust doctrine305 and some com-
mentators are skeptical that this concept will ever be well-re-
ceived.306 
Alternatively, several commentators307 have argued that the public 
trust doctrine should be included within the penumbra of unenu-
merated rights of the Ninth Amendment: "The enumeration in the 
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people. "308 They argue that the 
public trust doctrine encompasses the unenumerated, but fundamen-
tal, right to a clean environment and the preservation of natural 
resources and that breach of the trust amounts to a violation of the 
Constitution.309 Arguably, if the Supreme Court can discern a right 
of privacy from the Ninth Amendment's penumbra,310 the Court can 
recognize the right to an unpolluted and protected environment. 311 
305 See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 307 (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
466 (rev. ed. 1937». 
306 See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 307; Proprietary Duties, supra note 52, at 592. 
307 Cohen, supra note 261, at 392-94; M. SELVIN, supra note 23, at 419-20. See generally 
Roberts, The Right to a Decent Environment: Progress Along a Constitutional Avenue in 
LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 134 (M. Baldwin & J. Page, Jr. eds. 1970). 
308 U.S. CONST. amend. IX. 
309 Cohen, supra note 261, at 392-93; M. SELVIN, supra note 23, at 419-20. See also Van 
Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B. V.L. REV. 1 (1968). 
As the Court struggles in the future with the problems created by the impact of an 
increasingly complex and populous society upon the individual, it may discover that 
some substantial interests are inadequately protected by the Constitution from gov-
ernmental encroachment. If so, the Griswold opinion may provide a precedent for 
reliance upon the ninth amendment as a textual basis for the establishment of new 
constitutional rights. 
Id. at 3. See also Moore, The Ninth Amendment-Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEW ENG. L. 
REV. 215 (1972) (Ninth Amendment provides the means to adapt to the demands of a modern 
society). Cf Sagoff, On Preserving the Natural Environment in ETHICS AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 21 (D. Scherer & T. Attig, eds. 1983). 
To say that an environmental policy can be based on the Constitution does not require, 
of course, a constitutional passage or article which directly concerns the environment; 
rather the argument would rest on the concept of nationhood, the structure created 
by the Constitution as a single instrument functioning in all its parts. It is reasonable 
to think that cultural traditions and values [in appreciating the aesthetic quality in 
nature] constitute a condition-at least a causal onEl-<lf our political and legal free-
dom; and therefore, insofar as the Constitution safeguards our nation as a political 
entity, it must safeguard over cultural integrity as well. 
Id. at 29 (citation omitted). 
310 For a more detailed discussion of the penumbra rationale and the Ninth Amendment, 
see Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things For-
gotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. REV. 235 (1965). 
311 Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, 490 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("These statements of Madison 
and Story [regarding the Ninth Amendment] make clear that the Framers did not intend that 
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It may be that the right to the government's protection of natural 
resources, as encompassed in the public trust doctrine, is part of 
America's heritage of Roman-Anglo law and, as such, is so funda-
mental a right that any breach of the trust must constitute a violation 
of the Constitution. 
In sum, the public trust doctrine's position in federal law remains 
transitory. Although rooted in early-nineteenth century common law 
as a source of federal agency power, since the 1970's, the doctrine 
has been incorporated into several important federal statutes. In the 
future, if it is to reach its full potential in mandating protection of 
public lands, the public trust doctrine's right to a clean and protected 
environment arguably should be given constitutional status through 
the penumbra of the Ninth Amendment. 
3. Analogize to State Law 
The public trust doctrine developed much more extensively and 
as a more powerful tool at the state level than at the federal level. 
The doctrine itself is the same public trust doctrine that America 
inherited from the Romans and the English-it simply assumed 
different roles at the federal and state levels. Although state law is 
not binding on federal courts reviewing federal administrative 
agency decision-making, analogy to development of the doctrine at 
the state level is useful to demonstrate the doctrine's potential at 
the federal level and to strengthen the doctrine's viability as a tool 
against federal administrative agencies. 
For example, some state courts require that defendants show 
evidence of clear legislative intent to allow a specific diversion of 
public trust lands. 312 In this way the public trust doctrine acts as a 
the first eight amendments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental rights which 
the Constitution guaranteed to the people."); L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 
45 (1985) ("The Ninth Amendment thereby invites us, and our judges, to expand on the 
panoply of freedoms that are uniquely our heritage."). But see Bork, The Constitution, 
Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 (1986) ("The power 
of extreme generalization was demonstrated by William O. Douglas in Griswold v. Connecticut 
.... He ... generalized these particulars into an overall right of privacy that applies even 
where no provision of the Bill of Rights does. By choosing that level of abstraction, the Bill 
of Rights was expanded beyond the known intentions of the Framers."). 
312 These states include, among others, Massachusetts, New York, and California. See infra 
notes 314-20 and accompanying text. These courts have essentially adopted Professor Sax's 
theory of "limited review" regarding the public trust. Under this theory, courts should 
overturn any agency action that breaches the public trust unless these is a statute that 
specifically sanctions the agency's action. Sax, supra note 51, at 558-59. 
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powerful limitation on agency discretion.313 In Gould v. Greylock 
Reservation. Comm'n,314 for example, the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court held that a statute giving the defendant Commission 
power to lease a part of Mount Greylock reservation was not suffi-
ciently explicit to permit the construction of a tramway and ski 
resort. 315 The court therefore ordered the Commission to cancel its 
plan.316 Similarly, in Robbins v. Department of Public Works,317 the 
same court further restricted trust land diversion by holding that a 
statute authorizing the Department to relocate highways did not 
authorize the diversion because the statute did not identify specifi-
cally the meadow in question. 318 Furthermore, the court held that 
the statute did not show legislative awareness of the meadow's pre-
existing use. 319 The Robbins court stated that "the legislature should 
express not merely the public will for the new use but its willingness 
to surrender or forgo the existing use. "320 
Requiring specific legislative sanction of an agency's decisions re-
garding federal trust resources curtails agency discretion. Under 
this approach, the power to control trust resources rests with elected 
officials, not agency bureaucrats. Arguably, as representatives of 
the electorate who are the public trust beneficiaries, Congress could 
be more imbued with a sense of responsibility toward the trust 
resources than are administrative agencies. Therefore, this approach 
could result in more protection of federal trust resources. One dis-
advantage to requiring specific legislation, however, is that it would 
have a crippling effect upon agency action. Decisions regarding nat-
ural resources would be subject to Congress' ability to enact tailor-
made statutes. Potential solutions to this dilemma could include 
requiring specific legislation only in federal land use decisions of a 
certain magnitude or for the legislature to amend the agency's en-
abling act so as to limit the agency's discretion. 
313 See Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 310-11. 
314 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
315 [d. at 422-23, 215 N.E.2d at 123-24. 
316 [d. at 427, 215 N.E.2d at 126. 
317 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969). 
318 [d. at 331-32, 244 N.E.2d at 580. 
319 [d. 
32(J [d. at 331, 244 N.E.2d at 580. See also Stephenson v. County of Monroe, 43 A.D.2d 897, 
351 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1974) (use of park as sanitary landfill inconsistent with park purpose and 
must be specifically approved by the legislature); Big Sur Properties v. Mott, 62 Cal. App. 
3d 99, 132 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1976)(right-of-way across state park held inconsistent with park's 
use and may not be granted except by legislative enactment, even though there was no 
alternative access to private land). 
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Other state developments that could help strengthen the public 
trust doctrine at the federal level include, inter alia,: (1) application 
of the public trust doctrine to non-tideland resources, such as mead-
OWS,321 sport-caught fish,322 and parkland;323 (2) extending the tradi-
tionally protected uses of trust resources (navigation, commerce, 
and fishing) to include recreational uses and ecological preserva-
tion;324 (3) imposing an "affirmative duty to take the public trust into 
account in the planning and allocation of ... [natural] resources, and 
to protect public trust uses whenever feasible;"325 and (4) explicitly 
incorporating the public trust doctrine into the Constitution. 326 
Therefore, environmental plaintiffs could have more success in 
arguing that the public trust doctrine requires protection of federal 
public resources if such plaintiffs demonstrate that, at the state level, 
the same public trust doctrine already requires protection of state 
public resources. 327 
321 Robbins v. Department of Public Works, 355 Mass. 328, 244 N.E.2d 577 (1969). 
322 People v. Harbor Hut Restaurant, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1151, 196 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1983). 
323 Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966). 
324 Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971); State v. Superior 
Court of Lake County [Lyon], 29 Cal. 3d 210,625 P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696, cm. denied, 
Lyon v. California, 454 U.S. 865 (1981), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1094 (1981); State of California 
v. Superior Court of Placer County [Fogerty], 29 Cal. 3d 240, 625 P.2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 
713, cert. denied, Lyon v. California, 454 U.S. 865 (1981), reh'g denied, 454 U.S. 1094 (1981). 
See, Note, Lyon and Fogerty: Unprecedented Extensions of the Public Trust, 70 CAL. L. 
REV. 1138 (1982). 
325 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County [Mono Lake], 33 Cal. 3d 
419, 446, 658 P.2d 709, 728, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 364, cert. denied sub nom., Los Angeles Dept. 
of Water & Power v. National Audubon Society, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See, Note, Water Law-
Public Trust Doctrine (National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County), 24 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 809 (1984). 
326 See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. X, § 3 (tidelands trust), § 4 (right to access to navigable 
waters); HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (right to protection of natural resources), art. XII, § 4 
(state holds public lands in trust for the people of Hawaii); LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (right to 
protection and preservation of natural resources); MASS. CONST. amend. XCVII (right to 
protection of natural resources); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (state must maintain clean 
environment "for present and future generations"), art. X, § 11 (state public lands "shall be 
held in trust for the people"); PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (state, as trustee, must conserve natural 
resources for present and future generations); R.l. CaNST. art. I, § 17 (right to use the shore) 
(duty of the general assembly to provide for preservation of natural resources); TEX. CaNST. 
art. XVI, § 59 (right to conservation of natural resources). See also Pollock, State Constitu-
tions, Land Use and Public Resources: The Gift Outright, 1984 ANN. SURVEY OF AM. LAW 
13, 27-30 (1985). 
327 For in-depth discussions of various states' treatment of the public trust doctrine, see, 
e.g.,: Maleski, Sociobiology and the California Public Trust Doctrine: The New Synthesis 
Applied, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J. 429 (1985); Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine-A Tool 
For Expanding Recreational Rafting Rights in Colorado, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 625 (1986); 
Comment, The Public Trust Doctrine in Maine's Submerged Lands: Public Rights, State 
Obligations and the Role of the Courts, 37 MAINE L. REV. 105 (1985); Comment, The Public 
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4. Analogize To Indian Trust Law 
Another way for environmental advocates to strengthen the fed-
eral public trust doctrine in order to require protection of public 
resources is to analogize to Indian trust law.328 The federal Indian 
trust doctrine, like the public trust doctrine, evolved from common 
law. 329 Chief Justice Marshall first articulated the doctrine in Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia:330 "[Indian tribes'] relation to the United 
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. "331 In spite of its 
common law origins, the Indian trust doctrine is "one of the primary 
cornerstones of Indian law. "332 
Under the Indian trust doctrine, officials administering Indian 
property and affairs have been held to high fiduciary standards. 333 
For example, in Seminole Nation v. United States,334 the Supreme 
Court stated: 
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes, the 
Government is something more than a mere contracting party. 
Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found ex-
pression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of 
Trust Doctrine in Massachusetts Land Law, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 839 (1984); Fellig, 
Pursuit of the Public Trust: Beach Access in New Jersey from Neptune v. Avon to Matthews 
v. BHIA, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 35 (1985); Carmicheal, Sunbathers Versus Property 
Owners: Public Access to North Carolina Beaches, 64 N.C.L. REV. 159 (1985); Gordon, The 
Emergence of th" Public Trust Doctrine as a Public Right to Preservation in South Dakota, 
29 S.D.L. REV. 496 (1984); Morrison & Dollahite, The Public Trust Doctrine: Insuring the 
Needs of Texas Bays and Estuaries, 37 BAYLOR L. REV. 365 (1985); Allison, The Public Trust 
Doctrine in Washington, 10 UNIV. OF PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1987). 
328 See, e.g., Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and The Regulation of Private 
Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 260-62 (1976) (Professor Sax discusses an Indian trust case as 
a good example for Congress to follow with regard to the national parks problem). See also 
Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 274-76. Indian trust cases may only be used in analogy to public 
trust cases, and not in direct support thereof, because there are substantial differences 
between the two. For example, many Indian trust obligations date back to bilateral treaties 
entered into in the early part of American history. Also, Indian lands are not public lands. 
Id. 
329 See Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 
STAN. L. REV. 1213, 1215 (1975). 
330 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 178 (1831). 
33IId. at 181. Cherokee Nation involved an action by the Cherokee tribe to enjoin enforce-
ment of state statutes on lands guaranteed to the tribe by treaties. Id. at 179. The Court held 
that it lacked original jurisdiction because the tribe was not a "state." Id. at 183-84. See also 
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) ("These Indian tribes are the wards of 
the nation . . . . From their very weakness and helplessness so largely due to the course of 
dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, 
there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."). 
332 F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221 (1982 ed.). 
333 I d. at 226. 
334 316 U.S. 286 (1942). 
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this Court, it has charged itself with moral obligations of the 
highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the 
acts of those who represent it in dealings with the Indians, should 
therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards. 335 
429 
Additionally, courts have held executive officials to the same fidu-
ciary obligations as those imposed on private trustees. 336 Therefore, 
the officials, as trustees, must "do all acts necessary for the preser-
vation of the trust res which would be performed by a reasonably 
prudent man. "337 
As with agency actions regarding federal public lands, agency 
action regarding Indian lands and affairs are subject to judicial scru-
tiny under the Administrative Procedure Act. 338 In Indian law cases, 
however, the level of judicial scrutiny is heightened due to the 
agencies' fiduciary obligations. 339 In Morton v. Ruiz,340 for example, 
the Court imposed fiduciary standards on top of the standards of 
review required by the Administrative Procedure Act. 341 
335Id. at 296-97 (citations omitted). See also Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United States, 
299 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1937); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109-10, reh'g 
denied, 295 U.S. 769 (1935) ("The tribe was a dependent Indian community under the guard-
ianship of the United States, and therefore its property and affairs were subject to the control 
and management of that government. But this power to control and manage was not absolute 
.... [Ilt was subject to limitations inhering in such a guardianship .... "). 
336 F. COHEN, supra note 332, at 226. See also United States v. Mason, 412 U.S. 391, 398 
(1973); Manchester Band of Porno Indians, Inc. v. United States, 363 F. Supp. 1238, 1245 
(N.D. Cal. 1973). 
337 G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 582 (2d ed. 1960). See also Mason, 
412 U.S. at 398; Pomo Indians, 363 F. Supp. at 1245. For a discussion of private trustees' 
fiduciary duties, see supra notes 260-84. Cf. Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, reh'g 
denied, 464 U.S. 875 (1983). 
It may be that where only a relationship between the Government and the tribe is 
involved, the law respecting obligations between a trustee and a beneficiary in private 
litigation will in many, if not all, respects adequately describe the duty of the United 
States. But where Congress has imposed upon the United States, in addition to its 
duty to represent Indian tribes, a duty to obtain water rights for reclamation proj-
ects, ... the analogy of a faithless private fiduciary can not be controlling for purposes 
of evaluating the authority of the United States to represent different interests. 
463 U.S. at 142. For an in-depth discussion of Nevada, see Note, The Continuing Saga of 
Pyramid Lake: Nevada v. United States, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1067 (1984). 
338 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
339 C. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW 83 (1987). 
340 415 U.S. 199 (1974). 
341 Id. at 236. Ruiz involved a dispute over the Secretary of the Interior's denial of general 
assistance benefits to certain Indians because, as allegedly required by the Snyder Act, they 
did not live "on or near" a reservation. Id. at 204-205. Besides holding that the Secretary had 
failed to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and with the Bureau of Indian Affairs' 
own regulations, the Court stated: "The denial of benefits to these respondents under such 
circumstances is inconsistent with 'the distinctive obligation of trust incumbent upon the 
Government in its dealings with these dependent and sometimes exploited people.'" Id. at 
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As with the public trust doctrine, Congress has implicitly dele-
gated by statute its responsibilities with regard to Indians to federal 
agencies. 342 Thus, in a recent landmark decision, United States v. 
Mitchell,343 the Supreme Court held that, athough certain federal 
statutes did not specifically mention a "trust" or a "fiduciary rela-
tionship," those statutes established a trust relationship between the 
United States and Indians and the Government was liable for money 
damages for breach of those fiduciary duties.344 
The Mitchell case involved the Quinault Tribe's claim for damages 
due to the federal govern.ment's alleged mismanagement of reser-
vation timber lands.345 The Tribe asserted that this mismanagement 
constituted a breach of trust duties that the General Allotment Act 
imposed upon the United States. 346 In Mitchell I, the Court held 
that the General Allotment Act did not impose such fiduciary duties 
on the federal government but remanded the case to the Court of 
Claims to determine whether other statutes imposed such duties. 347 
The Court of Claims ruled that various timber management statutes 
and other statutes,348 including regulations promulgated under these 
235--37 (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942». For further 
discussion of the Ruiz case, see Davis, Administrative Surprises in the Ruiz Case, 75 MICH. 
L. REV. 823 (1975). 
342 See infra note 348 and accompanying text. 
343 463 U.S. 206 (1983) [hereinafter MitchelllI] . 
... Id. at 224-26. The Court held that the Claims Court had jurisdiction to hear the case 
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1491, 1505, which provides the United States' consent to 
be sued for claims founded "either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any 
regulation of an executive department." Id. at 212 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1982». The 
Court further found that the federal statutes granting primary responsibility to manage Indian 
resources to the Secretary of the Interior "can be fairly interpreted as mandating compensation 
for damages sustained." Id. at 226. Public trust beneficiaries' success in arguing for money 
damages due to breach of the public trust will depend in part upon their ability to increase 
judicial recognition of such fiduciary duties. Courts may then, as the Supreme Court did in 
Mitchell II, presume that the trust encompassed in myriad federal public land statutes gives 
"an injured beneficiary [the right] to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of 
the trust." Id. at 226 (citations omitted). 
345 445 U.S. 535, 537, reh'g denied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980) [hereinafter Mitchell I]. The Quinault 
Indians asserted, in particular, that the Government: 
(1) failed to obtain fair market value for timber sold; (2) failed to manage timber on 
a sustained-yield basis ... ; (3) failed to obtain payment for some merchantable 
timber; (4) failed to develop a proper system of roads and easements for timber 
operation ... ; (5) failed to pay interest on certain funds ... ; and (6) exacted excessive 
administrative charges from allotees. 
Id. at 537. 
346 Id. at 537. 
347Id. at 542, 546. 
348 The timber statutes included, inter alia,: 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1982)(Secretary of the Interior 
must manage Indian forest resources under the sustained-yield principle); 25 U.S.C. § 406(a) 
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statutes,349 imposed fiduciary duties upon the United States in its 
management of Indian lands. 350 
In Mitchell II, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims 
opinion and held that, because these statutes "give the Federal 
Government full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land 
for the benefit of the Indians, ... [t]hey thereby establish a fiduciary 
relationship and define the contours of the United States' fiduciary 
responsibilities. "351 The Court added: "Moreover, a fiduciary rela-
tionship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such elab-
orate control over forests and property belonging to Indians. All of 
the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee 
(the United States); a beneficiary (the Indian allotees); and a trust 
corpus (Indian timber, lands, and funds)."352 The Court held, there-
fore, that where the federal government exercises full responsibility 
over certain lands for the benefit of others, the existence of a trust 
relationship is presumed. 353 
The analogy to the public trust doctrine is apparent. Various 
federal land statutes grant the Secretary of the Interior full respon-
sibility to manage federal public lands for the benefit of the American 
people. 354 "All of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are 
present:"355 a trustee (the United States/Secretary of the Interior); 
(1982) (Secretary of the Interior must consider the present and future needs of the allotees 
in managing sales of timber on allotted lands); and 25 U.S.C. § 407 (1982)(Secretary's duties 
with regard to unallotted lands). 463 U.S. at 222. The other statutes included, inter alia,: 25 
U.S.C. §§ 323--325 (1982)(Secretary of the Interior's powers to grant rights-of-way across 
trust land subject to certain restrictions); and 25 U.S.C. § 162a (1982 & Supp. III 
1985)(Secretary's power to invest Indian trust funds when such investment is in the Indians' 
best interests). Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 223. 
349 The regulations included, inter alia,: 25 C.F.R. pt. 163 (1983)(promulgated under the 
Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C. § 466 (1982))(requiring "preservation of Indian forest 
lands in a perpetually productive state ... "); and 25 C.F.R. pt. 169 (1983). 463 U.S. at 221, 
223. 
350 664 F.2d 265, 269, 229 Cl. Ct. 1, 6 (1981), afl'd and remanded, 463 U.S. 206 (1983). 
351 463 U.S. at 224. 
352Id. at 225. In support thereof, the Court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2, 
comment h, at 10 (1959). Id. at 225 n.30. 
353 Id. at 225. For subsequent federal claims court dispositions of this case, see Mitchell v. 
United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 63, modified, 10 Cl. Ct. 787 (1986), later opinion, 13 Cl. Ct. 474 
(1987). For further discussion of Mitchell I & II, see Note, Indians May Sue for Breach of 
Federal Trust Relationship: United States v. Mitchell, 26 B.C.L. REV. 809 (1985); Note, 
Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 422 (1984); Note, 
Federal Government Held Accountable for Damages on Theory of Breach of Trust, 24 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 783 (1984); Note, Money Damages for Breach of the Federal-Indian Trust 
Relationship After Mitchell II-United States v. Mitchell, 59 WASH. L. REV. 675 (1984). 
354 See supm notes 51-104 and accompanying text. 
356 463 U.S. at 225. 
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a beneficiary (present and future Americans); and a trust corpus 
(federal public land and its resources). The existence of a trust 
relationship, therefore, is presumed. 356 Under the Mitchell II ra-
tionale, those federal agencies that are responsible for managing 
federal public lands have fiduciary duties with regard to those lands 
and must answer to the American people for breach of such duties. 
Indian trust law developed as a means to protect Indians who 
were collectively in a vulnerable position. It fulfilled a need that 
presented itself as a part of American history. Today, public trust 
resources are becoming increasingly vulnerable. Many resources, 
such as the giant redwoods, are irreplaceable. The public trust doc-
trine has the potential to develop as a means to protect those re-
sources; to fulfill a need now presenting itself as a part of American 
history. This potential may be realized, in part, if the federal gov-
ernment is imbued with the same sense of heightened responsibility 
toward public trust resources it recognizes in its duties toward the 
Indian nations. In this way, analogy to Indian trust law may 
strengthen the efficacy of the public trust doctrine. 
B. Potential Uses of a Strengthened Public Trust Doctrine In 
Actions Against Federal Administrative Agencies 
The public trust doctrine has already developed as a source of 
federal power over public lands. 357 Since the federal government 
uses the doctrine as a source of power, there is little justification for 
not using the doctrine as a means for imposing reciprocal duties on 
the federal government. The sword should cut both ways. Arguably, 
beneficiaries can already enforce the public trust through suing to 
force imposition of implied statutory duties. In the past, however, 
this remedy has been inadequate. 358 Valuable natural resources are 
still being permanently impaired. If the public trust is injected with 
new vitality,359 then there are several possible uses of a newly 
strengthened doctrine. 
356 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225. 
357 See, e.g., Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518 (1897)(Congress has authority to 
prohibit the erection of fences on private land which effectively enclosed public land.); United 
States v. Curtis-Nevada Mines, Inc., 611 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1980)(The United States, as 
trustee, has the power to enjoin the owner of unpatented mine claims from restricting access 
to, and recreational use of, the land's surface from the public.); Stewart v. Penny, 238 F. 
SUpp. 821 (D. Nev. 1965)(The Secretary of Interior, as trustee, has broad discretion to grant 
land patents.). 
356 See supra notes 12 and 110-78 and accompanying text. 
359 See supra notes 260-356 and accompanying text. 
1988] PROTECTING FEDERAL LAND 433 
1. Use as a Rule of Construction 
One way to use a strengthened public trust doctrine would be for 
courts to construe public land statutes liberally and in favor of public 
trust beneficiaries. 36o Again, analogy to Indian law supports this 
concept. It is a well-established principle of Indian law that "statutes 
passed for the benefit of dependent Indian tribes or communities are 
to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in 
favor of the Indians."361 Under this concept, courts should presume 
that Congress intended statutes affecting public resources to be 
interpreted in a manner consistent with Congress' role as public 
trustee. Courts should presume, therefore, that such statutes favor 
protection and preservation of natural resources. Courts could jus-
tify such a presumption by recognizing Congress' implicit delegation 
to federal agencies of its trusteeship through various federal land 
statutes. 362 This presumption then could be rebutted upon clear ev-
idence of congressional intent to the contrary.363 As with agency 
actions regarding Indian lands and affairs,364 this rule of construction 
would act as an important limitation on agency discretion in man-
aging the federal lands. 
2. Use as Part of the "Hard Look" Doctrine 
Another use of the public trust doctrine would be as part of the 
"hard look" doctrine. The Supreme Court developed this doctrine in 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,365 where it held 
that a court reviewing actions brought under the Administrative 
Procedure Act must consider "whether the [agency's] decision was 
based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there 
has been a clear error of judgment. "366 In deciding whether an agency 
has taken a "hard look" at the matter, courts should consider whether 
the federal agency, as assignee of Congress' public trusteeship, has 
360 See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 170; Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 311-13. 
361 Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918). See also North Chey-
enne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 
373, 392 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975); Choctaw Nation of 
Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 675 
(1912). 
362 See supra notes 53-107 and accompanying text. 
363 For discussion of the effect of this rule of construction on federal resource statutes, see 
Wilkinson, supra note 5, at 312-13. 
364 See F. COHEN, supra note 332, at 221-26. 
36? 401 U.S. 402 (1971). 
366 I d. at 416. 
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considered its public trust duties and has met its fiduciary duty of 
"an unusually high standard of ethical or moral conduct. . . . "367 The 
incentive for a court to impose this higher trust standard on agency 
action is twofold. First, it is arguably mandated by statutory dele-
gation of public trust duties and second, the standard gives the court 
a readily identifiable basis for judicial review. If the agency's action 
is not in keeping with its high fiduciary duties, then the court should 
find that such action is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion 
or otherwise not in accordance with law. "368 Arguably, imposing a 
public trust standard of review makes the court's job easier and the 
agency's job more difficult. As a result, the agency would have to 
take more care in reaching public land and resource decisions; the 
agency would be forced to take into consideration its public trust 
duties. 
3. Use as a General Principle of Environmental Law 
The public trust doctrine rationale could also serve as a general 
principle of environmental law.369 One commentator characterized 
this general principle as a legal concept to which "courts can ... 
refer when evaluating and resolving conflicts betwen [sic] environ-
mental values and other values . . . . "370 It seems inequitable that 
"courts have at their disposal no legal theory to balance the rights 
of the government in public land against what many argue are 
equally legitimate, but as yet judicially unrecognized, rights of the 
public in the same property. "371 Using the public trust doctrine as a 
general principle could be an effective mechanism for providing pro-
tective, preservational and environmental values that would coun-
terbalance many agencies' politically-induced economic values. For 
example, courts could refer to public trust values in determining 
whether the Secretary of the Interior's actions have complied with 
the multiple-use sustained-yield mandate to consider both environ-
mental and economic potential uses. 372 Like the use of the public 
367 G. BOGERT, supra note 263, § l. 
368 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Note that if public trust proponents succeed 
in arguing that the public trust doctrine is based in the penumbra of the Ninth Amendment 
(see supra notes 307-311 and accompanying text) they will be able to challenge agency action 
under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), as being "contrary to a constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity .... " 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
369 See Montgomery, supra note 8, at 174-8l. 
37°ld. at 175. 
371 ld. at 177 (citation omitted). 
372 See supra notes 244-59 and accompanying text for discussion of the multiple-use sus-
tained-yield policy. 
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trust doctrine as a rule of construction, this use proposes the doctrine 
as a supplement to the statutory guidelines.373 It goes one step 
further, however, and suggests a broader use of the doctrine as a 
"conceptual framework" in which to exercise judicial review. 374 
Within this "conceptual framework, "375 courts should consider 
whether the agency has complied both with its public trust, as well 
as its statutory, duties. Since public trust duties require agencies to 
act as fiduciaries with regard to public land and resources, agencies' 
actions with regard to such land must be moral and ethical. 376 There-
fore, judicial scrutiny of actions regarding public trust resources 
must involve moral and ethical scrutiny. According to H.L.A. Hart,: 
What surely is most needed in order to make men clear sighted 
in confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should 
preserve the sense that certification of something as legally valid 
is not conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however 
great the aura of majesty or authority which the official system 
may have, its demands must in the end be submitted to moral 
scrutiny. 377 
Additionally, according to one commentator, "[i]t is inconceivable 
... that an ethical relation to land can exist without love, respect, 
and admiration for land and a high regard for its value. "378 If one 
accepts this premise, then the public trust doctrine not only imposes 
ethical duties but also helps to provide a conceptual framework for 
courts to determine if an agency has complied with such ethical 
duties through referring to the doctrine's mandate of preservation 
and protection-that is, "a high regard for [the land's] value."379 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The review of federal public trust law necessarily leaves the ob-
server with a sense of ambivalence. Numerous federal statutes os-
tensibly serve to protect most of the public trust corpus. Like the 
373 Montgomery, supra note 8, at 178. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 The law of trusts demands of the trustee, as a fiduciary, "an unusually high standard of 
ethical and moral conduct .... " G. BOGERT, supra note 263, § 1. See also J. PETULLA, 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 162 (1987). 
377 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 206 (1961). 
378 Leopold, The Land Ethic in ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 7 (D. Scherer & T. Attig 
eds. 1983). See also Rolston, Is There An Ecological Ethic? in ETHICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
41 (D. Scherer & T. Attig eds. 1983). 
379 Leopold, supra note 378, at 7. 
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court in Sierra Club v. Andrus , 380 most courts currently hold that 
resort to the public trust doctrine is unnecessary because the doc-
trine's duties are imposed statutorily. However, because of both the 
judicial tendency to defer to administrative agency expertise in nat-
ural resource matters, and the current multiple-use philosophy, 381 
many natural resources are, in reality, left unprotected. Therefore, 
there is a need for a strong, clearly defined public trust doctrine. 
One reason that courts may be reluctant to impose public trust duties 
is that the doctrine is hard to define, and thus hard to apply. Anal-
ogies to classic trust law, state law, Indian trust law, and determin-
ing the doctrine's position in modern jurisprudence should help clar-
ify and strengthen the public trust doctrine. Once the doctrine has 
become a more effective environmental tool, it could be used as a 
rule of construction, as part of Overton's "hard look" doctrine,382 and 
as a general principle of environmental law. Such uses of a refined 
public trust doctrine could force federal administrative agencies to 
recognize their public trust obligations and to enhance the protection 
of valuable and irreplaceable natural resources. 
380 487 F. Supp. 443 (D. D.C. 1980), afi'd, Sierra Club v. Watt, 659 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 
1981). See supra notes 142-51 and accompanying text. 
381 See supra notes 244--59 and accompanying text. 
382 See supra notes 365-68 and accompanying text. 
